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The Airline Passenger Data Disclosure Case 




María Verónica Pérez Asinari* and Yves Poullet** 
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In the aftermath of the events of 11th September 2001, decisions have been taken 
unilaterally by US authorities requiring air line companies to provide direct access or 
transfer of data concerning passengers and cabin crews flying to, from or within the US 
to certain US administrations.  These decisions have been challenged by EU authorities 
insofar they constitute a violation of EU privacy and personal data protection law which 
is considered to be of public order. The debate is still pending.  
 
The present paper will comment on this complex and multi-featured discussion 
opposing two fundamental societal values: on the one hand, the right of the citizens to 
be protected from terrorism and the obligation of a sovereign State to fight against it and 
safeguard public security1, and on the other hand, the individuals’ right to personal data 
protection and privacy and the obligation of the EU, in the light of international and 
supranational commitments, to protect them in this arena. After a short presentation of 
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**Dean of the Faculty of Law, Director of the CRID. 
 
This article expresses the own views of the authors. In no way might it be interpreted as the opinion of the 
organisations to which they belong. 
 
We would like to thank Jean-Marc DINANT, researcher at the CRID, for his clarifying comments. 
 
1 In the EU, the fight against terrorism is one of the specific objectives mentioned in Article 29 TEU. The 
Framework Decision of 13 June 2002 on combating terrorism, OJCE L 164, 22.6.2002, has declared: 
“Whereas: (1) The European Union is founded on the universal values of human dignity, liberty, equality 
and solidarity, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. It is based on the principle of 
democracy and the principle of the rule of law, principles which are common to the Member States. 
(2) Terrorism constitutes one of the most serious violations of those principles. The La Gomera 
Declaration adopted at the informal Council meeting on 14 October 1995 affirmed that terrorism 
constitutes a threat to democracy, to the free exercise of human rights and to economic and social 
development. (…)”. 
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the US decisions and their context (Point I), the authors will analyse the EU position, its 
claim for an adequate personal data protection to be ensured by the US authorities and 
the legal grounds for this position (Point II). Finally, a synthetic approach to the 




I. The US legal framework 
 
 
I.1. The legislative context 
 
 
Directly after the tragedy of 11th of September 2001, the US Government took a great 
amount of initiatives to fight against terrorism. The Patriot Act2, which is commonly 
known, is one example. However, more specific legislation has been enacted as well, in 
order to tackle the risks created by the terrorist threat. 
 
In the immigration and admission of aliens sphere,  the Enhanced Border Security and 
Visa Entry Reform Act3 was enacted on 14th May 2002. As regards  air transportation,  
the US adopted the Aviation and Transportation Security Act (ATSA)4 on 19th 
November 2001. This Act has been followed by secondary regulations,  notably the 
document “Passenger and Crew Manifests Required for Passengers Flights in Foreign 
Air Transportation to the United States”, published in the Federal Register on 31st 
December 20015, and the document “Passenger Name Record Information Required for 
Passengers on Flights in Foreign Air Transportation to or from the United States”, 




                                                 
 
2 107th Congress, 24th October 2001. The PATRIOT Act has been extensively analysed. Whereas certain 
sectors consider that it “eliminated the checks and balances that previously gave courts he opportunity to 
ensure that these powers were not abused” (Electronic Frontier Foundation “EFF Analysis of the 
Provisions of the USA PATRIOT Act”, 31st October  2001, available at: 
http://www.eff.org/Privacy/Surveillance/Terrorism_militias/20011031_eff_usa_patriot_analysis.php , last 
visited 08/03/02), others argue that “the common wisdom on the USA Patriot Ac is incorrect. The Patriot 
Act did not expand law enforcement powers dramatically, as its critics have alleged. In fact, the Patriot 
Act made mostly minor amendments to the electronic surveillance laws” (O. KERR “Internet 
Surveillance Law After the USA PATRIOT Act: the Big Brother that isn’t”, The George Washington 
University Law School, Public Law and Legal Theory Working Paper No. 043, available at: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=317501). 
 
3 Public Law 107-173, 107th Congress. 
 
4  Public Law 107-71, 107th Congress. 
 
5 Department of Treasury, Customs Service, (66 FR 67482) T.D. 02-01. 
 
6 Department of Treasury, Customs Service, (67 FR 42710) T.D. 02-33. 
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The main purpose of all this legislation is to enhance security for the fight against 
terrorism and create what the US authorities have called a “21st Century Smart Border”7. 
In order to achieve this goal, the Government and Parliament have given a very large 
mandate to a new public body: the Transportation Security Agency (TSA), which is part 
of the Department of Homeland Security8, to take appropriate measures in order to 
improve aviation security.   
 
One of the most important decisions taken in this context was to use information 
technology, particularly risk analysis tools, for detecting terrorists. All the data 
transmitted by the air transportation companies will be centralized in a large database, 
operated both by US Customs and Immigration and Naturalization Services. 
Furthermore, a Computer Assisted Passenger Pre-screening Program (CAPPS II) is 
cretaed  to evaluate all passengers before they board an aircraft. We will comment more 




I.2. The measures 
 
 
The above referred regulations have created different obligations for air carriers, which 
derive also in different information management systems, either centralized or not. 
 
The Advanced Passenger Information System (APIS) deals with all the data requested 
from and transmitted by all air transportation companies. The ATSA stipulates the 
following:  
 
“(1) IN GENERAL.- Not later than 60 days after the date of enactment of the 
Aviation and Transportation Act, each air carrier and foreign air carrier 
operating a passenger flight in foreign ain transportation to the United States 
shall privide to the Commissioner of Customs by electronic transmission a 
passenger and crew manifest containing the information specified in paragraph 
(2). Carriers may use the advanced passeger information system established 
under section 431 of the tariff Act of 1930 (19 U.S.C. 1431) to provide the 
information required by the preceding sentence. 
                                                 
7 See on that concept the declaration made by A. Hutchinson, under-secretary of Border and 
Transportation Security at the US Department of Homeland Security, while referring to the US VISIT 
system as part of the comprehensive information system that will provide the United States with a “smart 
border” that “expedites legitimate trade and travel, but stops terrorists in their tracks”. This system “will 
be based on visas that include biometric features such as fingerprints and photographs to permit 
identification of foreign visitors when they arrive. (…) Through this ‘virtual border’ we will know who 
violates our entry requirements, who overstays or violates the terms of their stay, and who should be 
welcome again”. She further expressed that these initiatives must not be considered as a way to exclude 
any immigrants, “[i]mmigrants still search for the American Dream. And when they find it, all American 
benefit”, reported in “Hutchinson says new system provides America with ‘smart border’”,  web site of 
the US Mission to the E.U, 19th May 2003, available at :  
http://www.useu.be/Terrorism/USResponse/May1903USVISITSystem.html , last visited 08/08/03. 
 
8 The TSA has been created under the ATSA. 
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(2) INFORMATION.- A passenger and crew manifest for a flight required under 
paragraph (1) shall contain the following information: 
(A) The full name of each passenger and crew member. 
(B) The date of birth and citizenship of each passenger and crew member. 
(C) The sex of each passenger and crew member. 
(D) The passport number and country of issuance of each passenger and 
crew member if required for travel. 
(E) The United States visa number or resident alien card number of each 
passenger and crew member, as applicable. 
(F) Such other information as the Under Secretary, in consultation with the 
Commissioner of Customs, determines is reasonably necessary to ensure 
aviation safety”9. 
 
Paragraph (4) establishes that the passenger and crew manifest shall be transmitted to 
the Customs Service in advance of the aircraft landing in the US10. Furthermore, the 
following paragraph regulates on PNR: 
 
“(3) PASSENGER NAME RECORDS.- The carriers shall make passenger name 
record information available to Customs Service upon request”11. 
 
As we have already seen, certain documents have been published in the Federal Register 
specifying these regulations. The Interim rule of 31st December 2001 has extended the 
required data elements for the manifests, for instance, by adding the obligation to 
transmit electronically to Customs “(3) [t]he foreign airport where each passenger 
began his air transportation to the United States; for each passenger and crew member 
destined to the United States, the airport in the United States where the passenger and 
crew member will process through Customs and Immigration formalities; and for each 
passenger and crew member transiting through the United States and not clearing 
through Customs and Immigration formalities, the foreign airport of final destination 
for the passenger and crew member”12. 
 
In what concerns PNR, the Interim rule of 25th June 2002 states, among other issues, 
that “[i]n order to readily provide Customs with such access to requested PNR data, 
each air carrier must ensure that its electronic reservation/departure control systems 
correctly interface with the US Customs data Center, Customs Headquarters”13. It is 
clear then, that these data will not be “transferred” (as a first step, see infra)  but directly 
“accessed” on-line. 
 
                                                 
9 Sec. 115. Passenger Manifest, paragraph (c). Amendment to 49 USC 44909. 
 
10 The Interim rule of 31st December 2001 states that this transfer should be made “not later than 15 
minutes after the departure of the aircraft from the last foreign port or place”, p. 67483.  
 
11 Sec. 115. Passenger Manifest, paragraph (c). Amendment to 49 USC 44909. 
 
12See  p. 67483. 
 
13See  p. 42710. 
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The Interim rule we are commenting further mentions, “merely to be illustrative”, 
certain data elements to which Customs may request access in relation to a passenger14: 
 
(1) Last name; first name; date of birth; address(es); and phone number(s); 
(2) Passenger name record locator (reservation) number; 
(3) Reservation date (or dates, if multiple reservations made), or if no advance 
reservation made (“go show”); 
(4) Travel agency/agent, if applicable; 
(5) Ticket information; 
(6) Form of payment for ticket; 
(7) Itinerary information; 
(8) Carrier information for the flight, including but not limited to: carrier 
information for each segment of the flight if not continuous; the flight 
number(s); and date(s) of intended travel; 
(9) Seating; and 
(10) PNR history15. 
 
Indeed, PNR data contains other information, some of them of sensitive nature. PNR, 
for instance,  stores the requested kind of food for the flight (this food can have health, 
philosophical or religious connotations), whether any facilities for disable are needed16, 
etc. It also stores who will pay for the bill (company, association, university, public 
body, party, etc.) and even in relation to which internal account (what is normally 
connected to a specific client, project, etc.). The itinerary field includes all air space and 
related non-airline, auxiliary services the passenger requested.17 
 
                                                 
14 See p. 42711. 
 
15 The history of PNR contains changes and deletions to a PNR from the date it was created (footnote 
added by the authors). 
 
16 Under the PNR system, those fields are called SSR (Special Service Request).  
 
17 For a practical description of PNR see: “Lesson: Passenger Name Record”, Advanced Worldspan, 
available at: 
http://globallearningcenter.wspan.com/emealearningcenter/PDFs/Student%20Workbooks/210/1101%20P
NR%20Lesson.pdf , last visited 02/09/03. See also: E. HASBROUCK “Total Travel Information 
Awareness”, available at: http://hasbrouck.org/articles/travelprivacy.html , last visited 18/08/03. In this 
article we read: “Passenger Name Records (PNR's) maintained by airlines, computerized reservations 
systems or "global distribution systems" (CRS's/GDS's), and travel agencies don't just contain flight 
reservations and ticket records. They include car, hotel, cruise, tour, sightseeing, and theater ticket 
bookings, among other types of entries. PNR's show where you went, when, with whom, for how long, 
and at whose expense. Behind the closed doors of your hotel room, with a particular other person, they 
show whether you asked for one bed or two. Through departmental and project billing codes, business 
travel PNR's reveal confidential internal corporate and other organizational structures and lines of 
authority and show which people were involved in work together, even if they travelled separately. 
Particularly in the aggregate, they reveal trade secrets, insider financial information, and information 
protected by attorney-client, journalistic, and other privileges. Through meeting codes used for 
convention and other discounts, PNR's reveal affiliations -- even with organizations whose membership 
lists are closely-held secrets not required to be divulged to the government. (…)”.  More specifically on 
PNR, by the same author, see: “What's in a Passenger Name Record (PNR)?”, available at: 
http://hasbrouck.org/articles/PNR.html , last visited 18/08/03. 
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Another system to be implemented is the US VISIT18, which consists in a systematic 
scanning of the travel documents of each US visitor. Photo and fingerprints will be 
taken and the data so obtained will be checked against lists of those who should be 
denied the entry within the US territory for different reasons (terrorism, criminal 
violations, illegal entry, visa violations)19. This system will permit to centrally process 
personal data including certain data based on biometric features20 (today digital photo 
and fingerprints tomorrow facial recognition and iris scans)21 . In order to facilitate this 
work, visa waiver countries are required to use tamper-proof passports that include 
biometric identifiers from August 2004. This data will not be requested to airline 
companies, so, we will not develop this aspect in the present paper. However, we are of 
the opinion that its existence had to be mentioned here insofar US regulations would 
permit interconnections between the PNR data and the data generated in the context of 
the US VISIT program. 
 
The TSA is authorized, apart from to use the data collected through these two sources, 
to establish a ”watch-list” of individuals suspected of posing “a risk of air piracy or 
terrorism or a threat to airline or passenger safety”22. Furthermore, the different airline 
companies are operating the Computer Assisted Pre-screening Program (CAPPS), a 
passenger–screening tool, in order to identify passengers for enhanced screening before 
their boarding.  
 
An updated version of CAPPS23, CAPPS II, is presently being developed for providing 
a more efficient identification of terrorist risks. “Essentially, CAPPS II process will be a 
passive system that produces a general indication of the level of terrorist risk each 
airline passenger might pose to civil aviation security. It will be activated by a 
traveller’s airline reservation request. Airlines will ask passengers for specific 
reservation information that will include passenger’s full name, plus other identifiers 
including date of birth, home address and home phone number. Passengers will not be 
asked to provide social security numbers, and TSA will not look at credit worthiness. 
The CAPPS II process will then authenticate each passenger’s identity through publicly 
and commercially available databases. Once a passenger’s identity is authenticated and 
the passenger’s information is run against terrorist or appropriate Federal Government 
                                                 
18 Planned to be implemented from January 2004. 
 
19 $400 million have been foreseen by the Congress to set up the system. 
 
20 For a European view regarding biometrics see: Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Working 
Document on biometrics, 1st August 2003, WP 80, available at: 
http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/internal_market/privacy/docs/wpdocs/2003/wp80_en.pdf 
 
21 On all that see “Hutchinson says…”, op.cit. 
 
22 In fact, documents obtained by EPIC demonstrate the existence of two lists: the “No-Fly” watchlist and 
the “selectee” list regarding persons submitted to additional security measures. The criteria for putting a 
name into the list remain secret. See: EPIC “Documents show errors in TSA’s ‘No-Fly’ watchlist”, April 
2003, available at: http://www.epic.org/privacy/airtravel/foia/watchlist_foia_analysis.html  , last visited 
08/08/03. 
 
23 The first CAPPS has been created after the Lockerbie bombing of a PanAM jet. 
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systems, an aggregate numerical threat score will be generated that TSA will use to 
determine which passengers should proceed through the ordinary screening process and 
which passengers should be asked to a somewhat more thorough screening. In 
extremely rare cases, the system may identify an individual who is a known foreign 
terrorist or the associate of a known foreign terrorist. In such a case, law enforcement 
authorities would be notified and given the opportunity to take appropriate action”.24  
 
All these systems will be operated under the control of the TSA. Privacy issues are not 
absent of the implementation of all these systems. The administrator of the TSA, James 
M. Loy, said that the TSA is taking privacy issues into account as it develops CAPPS II: 
“CAPPS II will operate under a stringent privacy protection protocol being developed 
through discussions with privacy groups (…). Strict firewalls and access rules will 
protect a traveller’s information from inappropriate use, sharing, or disclosure”25.  
 
According to the ATSA requirement, a Privacy Officer has been nominated in the US 
Department of Homeland Security26  to implement privacy requirements and to control 
their respect. This Privacy Officer is member of the Department of Homeland Security. 
 
It is quite obvious that all the measures described affect significantly data controllers27 
which are operating from foreign countries and create new risks for the protection of 
personal data with European origin. The data relates to travellers (more or less 12 
millions of passengers) flying to US and the requirements of US government interfere 
with the national legislation applicable to airline companies’ data processing activities 
in the foreign countries where the passengers make the reservation, buy the ticket, take 
the plane, etc., and put into question their sovereignty by operating far beyond the US 
borders. To justify this extraterritorial approach, US authorities have developed a new 
conception of their own sovereignty not limited to the physical borders: “[b]ut in the 
                                                 
24 Statement of Admiral James M. Loy, Administrator of the Department of Homeland Security’s 
Transportation Security Administration, before the House of Representatives Subcommittee on 
Technology  and Information Policy, 6th May 2003, available at :  
http://www.useu.be/Terrorism/USResponse/May0603LoyITTransportSecurity.html   , last visited 
08/08/03. 
 
25 Statement of Admiral James M. Loy, Administrator of the Department of Homeland Security’s 
Transportation Security Administration, before the House of Representatives Subcommittee on 
Technology  and Information Policy, 6th May 2003, available at :  
http://www.useu.be/Terrorism/USResponse/May0603LoyITTransportSecurity.html   , last visited 
08/08/03. It has to be noted that from a European perspective, as we will see later on, the implementation 
of security measures is one of the obligations of data controllers, but certainly not the only one. 
 
26 This person is N.O’Connor Kelly, who was present at the Hearing organized by the European 
Parliament. She insisted on the fact that the creation of this position was a “historic development in 
privacy and data protection in US”  insofar it marks the “first statutorily mandated, Congressionally 
created privacy officer for the Department of Homeland Security (…)”, see the report at the United States 
Mission to the European Union website “US Officials Discuss Homeland Security, passenger name 
Record with EU”, available at: 
http://www.useu.be/Terrorism/USResponse/May0603BrowingPNREP.html , last visited 08/08/03. 
 




21st Century, border security can no longer be just a coastline, or a line on the ground 
between two nations. It’s also a line of information in a computer, telling us who is in 
the country, for how long, and for what reason… In the 21th Century it is not enough to 
place inspectors at our ports of entry to monitor the flow of goods and people. We must 
also have a ‘virtual border’ that operates far beyond the land border of the United 
States”28. This reasoning has been also held in the context of the ECHELON case29, 
which is a UK-US system of electronic surveillance of the messages exchanged through 
satellites. The ECHELON system was, indeed, criticized  by the European Parliament as 
violating the European fundamental right to privacy30.   
 
Notwithstanding, the TSA issued a notice narrowing the scope of the CAPPS II, 
published on the Federal Register on 1st August 200331. This notice describes how the 
TSA will use CAPPS II and which changes have been made from the notice published 
at the Federal Register on 15th January 2003. Indeed, many comments and negative 
reactions were received in response to the prior Privacy Act notice. That  has generated 
an obvious need to make some reforms in the proposal to make it data privacy 
compliance. For instance, whereas the original document on CAPPS II stated that 
information about individuals would be maintained for up to 50 years, the new notice 
expressed that for almost all passengers, that information will be deleted soon after the 
trip is safely completed, and for a “few risk” persons, the length of time the information 
will be kept is still under consideration. 
 
 
I.3. Reactions in the US 
 
 
“Jan Adams and Rebecca Gordon of California, for example, were detained at San 
Francisco International Airport, and told that their names appeared on the secret ‘no-fly’ 
list.  The two women – peace activists who publish a newspaper called War Times – 
were told nothing about why they were on such a list, or how they could get off.  The 
ACLU has filed suit against the Federal Government on their behalf to find out how the 
                                                 
28 See the report “Hutchinson says new system provides America with ‘smart border’”, op. cit. As regards 
the modern notion of “sovereignty”, see the developments and quotations, in Y. POULLET, “Pour une 
justification des articles 25 et 26 en matière de flux transfrontières”, in Liber amicorum B. De Schutter, 
VUB Press, 2003, p. 280 and ss. 
 
29 About ECHELON see the Federation of American Scientists’ website:  
http://www.fas.org/irp/program/process/echelon.htm. And the report Y. POULLET and J.M. DINANT, 
“Le réseau Echelon existe t’il ? Que peut-il faire ? Peut-on et doit-on s’en protéger ?” Report published 
by the Belgian Committee of Surveillance, 1999, p. 13 and ss., available at: 
http://www.droit.fundp.ac.be/textes/echelonfr.pdf 
  
30  See the European Parliament Resolution , 5th September 2001 and the Working Paper of the European 
Parliament temporary Committee on the Echelon Interception System (Schmidt Report), available at: 
http://fas.org/irp/program/process/europarl.draft.pdf.  
 
31 Department of Homeland Security, Transportation Security Administration, Docket No.DHS/TSA-
2003-1, Privacy Act of 1974: Notice of Status of System of Records; Interim Final Notice; Request for 
Further Comments, (68 FR 45265). 
 
 8
‘no fly’ lists were created, how they are being maintained or corrected and, most 
importantly, how people who are mistakenly included on the list can have their names 
taken off. One question we believe needs answering is whether our clients are on the ‘no 
fly’ list because of their First Amendment protected political views”.32 
 
This is just an example of the role that civil liberties advocates are playing in the 
discussion on the implementation of the new measures. The Electronic Privacy 
Information Center ( EPIC) had posted on its website several pages33 with news about 
the debate on passenger data and the campaigns against the US policy. Moreover, they 
have submitted an action against the Department of Homeland Security, the 
Transportation Security Administration and the Department of Defense, under the 
Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), seeking the release of agency records concerning 
airline passenger screening procedures requested by EPIC from defendants.34 
 
Indeed, EPIC sent a letter to the TSA on 10th March 2003 requesting records related to 
CAPPS II project addressing the following subjects: “(a) any existing legal, statutory 
and/or regulatory frameworks concerning governmental access to and use of 
transactional and other records about individuals. This request includes, but is not 
limited to, any assessments of the legal authority (or lack thereof) for information 
collection activities planned or proposed for the CAPPS II project; and (b) potential 
privacy and/or civil liberties implications of the activities planned or proposed for the 
CAPPS II project”. The answer was delivered late and incomplete. 
 
Apart from that, John Gilmore, a US citizen, filed a lawsuit against John Ashcroft (in 
his official capacity as Attorney General of the US) and other civil servants (with 
responsibilities in connected areas). Giving a frame to his action he said that he was 
“concerned that the climate of fear that currently pervades American society [is] eroding 
long-standing constitutional rights”.35 Basically, he challenged the “secret” character of 
a regulation limiting people right to travel anonymously and the use of “no-fly lists” 
that are created and maintained without transparency and control. In his complaint it is 
expressed: “[p]laintiff objects to the unregulated use of such lists because he believes 
history teaches that granting the government unlimited control over ‘enemies list’ will 
inevitably result in abuse”. It is interesting to see the myriad of constitutional causes of 
action raised by the plaintiff.36  
                                                 
32 Testimony of Barry Steinhardt, Director of the ACLU Technology and Liberty Program on 
Government Data Mining Before the House Government Reform Subcommittee on Technology, 
Information Policy, Intergovernmental Relations and the Census, available at: 
http://www.aclu.org/SafeandFree/SafeandFree.cfm?ID=12669&c=206 , last visited 04/09/03. 
 
33  See the EPIC’s website : http://www.epic.org/privacy/intl/passenger_data.html , last visit 22/08/03. 
 
34 EPIC v. DHS, TSA and DoD; United States District Court for the District of Columbia, available at: 
http://www.epic.org/privacy/airtravel/capps2-suit.pdf , last visited 02/09/03. 
 
35 John Gilmore v. John Ashcroft et alii, United States District Court Northern District of California, 
available at: http://cryptome.org/gilmore-v-usa-cid.htm , last visited 18/08/03. 
 
36 (1) Vagueness in Violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment of the United States; (2) 
Violation of the Right to be Free from Unreasonable Searches and Seizures in Violation of the Fourth 
Amendment of the United States Constitution; (3) Violation of the Right to Travel in Violation of the Due 
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Particularly in what concerns the First Amendment, it has been pointed out that “[f]ew 
activities implicate the assembly clause of the First Amendment as directly as travel. 
When people travel to assemble, as they do when they travel for business or 
organization meetings or conventions, or to meet friends and relatives, their travel is an 
act of assembly. Travel is not just an activity often engaged in for purposes protected 
under other clauses of the First Amendment (such as travel to petition the government 
for a redress of grievances, or travel for purposes protected as freedom of speech or of 
the press), but travel is, in and of itself, an activity directly protected under the assembly 
clause of the First Amendment”.37 
 
Even if the final decisions of the cases referred have not been adopted yet, we could see 
that the way the measures we are discussing here is being implemented does not only 





II. The EU answers: from the stand-still position towards adequate protection 
 
 
The nature of the extra-territorial effects of the US decisions have provoked reactions 
from the EU authorities39. We will comment on them in what follows. Nevertheless, we 
will make first a description of the European and EU legal background in what concerns 
privacy and personal data protection in order to visualize clearly the legal fundaments of 
EU concerns. We will also assess which would be the legal basis to regulate on the 
trans-border data flows (TBDF) under analysis. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                               
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution; (4) Violation of the Right to 
Travel and Associate Anonymously in Violation of the First and Fifth Amendment of the United States 
Constitution; (5) Violation of the Right to Petition the Government for Redress of Grievances in 
Violation of the First Amendment of the United States Constitution; (6) Violation of the Right to Equal 
Protection in Violation of the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution.  
 
37 E. HASBROUCK “Establishment and Exemption from the Privacy Act of Records System DOT/TSA 
010, ‘Aviation Security-Screening Records (ASSR)’”, 23th February 2003, available at: 
http://hasbrouck.org/articles/Hasbrouck_DOT_comments-23FEB2003.pdf , last visited 02/09/03. 
 
38 Pending Bills dealing with CAPPS II have been object of different Amendments issued by members of 
the US Senate and the US House of Representatives. See: the Wyden Amendment,  available at: 
http://www.epic.org/privacy/airtravel/wyden_capps_amdt.pdf , last visited 02/09/03; the Sabo 
Amendment, available at: http://www.house.gov/sabo/pr03-18.htm , last visited 02/09/03. 
 
39 As well as from European civil liberties advocates. See, for instance, the “Campaign against the illegal 
transfer of European travellers’ data to the USA” organised by EDRI (European Digital Rights), 
information available at: http://www.edri.org/cgi-bin/index?funktion=view&id=000100000085 , last 
visited 08/08/03.  
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When analysing privacy and data protection applicable legislation in Europe we have to 
consider a plethora of instruments at different levels. It is important to understand their 
different scope of application as well as their relevance. 
 
In the International context we have to focus on the Council of Europe Convention. 
Privacy is a fundamental right included in article 8 of the European Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms40, where it is stated: 
 
“1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home 
and his correspondence. 
2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this 
right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a 
democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the 
economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for 
the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and 
freedoms of others.” 
 
This provision has been largely interpreted by the doctrine, as well as applied by the 
European Court of Human Rights (ECHR).41 It is the source for EU legislation dealing 
with privacy and the protection of personal data, as well as of national legislation. We 
will come back to the interpretation given by the ECHR to the exception contained in 
point 2 of the Article, since it is clearly relevant for the topic under study. 
 
The Council of Europe has adopted also the Convention for the Protection of 
Individuals with regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data no. 10842, and a series 
                                                 
 
40 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms ETS no.: 005, Rome 
4/11/50. Available at: http://conventions.coe.int/treaty/en/WhatYouWant.asp?NT=005 
D. YERNAULT “L’efficacité de la Convention Européenne des Droits de l’homme pour contester le 
système ‘Echelon’ ”, in Sénat et Chambre des Représentants de Belgique, Rapport sur l’existence 
éventuelle d’un réseau d’interception des communications, nommé ‘Echelon’ , 25 Feb. 2002. In this 
article, the author studies the nature of the ECHR: (1) as an instrument guaranteeing “European public 
order”, considered as a coherent whole, in the sense that it was qualified by the Strasbourg Court in 1995; 
(2) as an international treaty that gives place to the State’s international liability;  and (3) as an 
international treaty of a particular nature, due to its Article 53, by virtue of which adherent States 
recognise its legal pre-eminence over any other internal or international regulation that would be less 
protective of Fundamental Rights than the Convention itself.   
 
41 Case “Amann v. Switzerland” (Application n. 27798/95), Strasbourg, 16 February 2000; Case “Rotaru 
v. Romania” (Application n. 28341/95), Strasbourg, 4 May 2000; Case “P.G. and J.H. v. The United 
Kingdom” (Application n. 44787/98), Strasbourg, 25 September 2001, etc. 
 
42 Council of Europe Convention for the Protection of Individuals with regard to Automatic Processing of 




of Recommendations following a sectoral criteria43. We have to bear in mind that this 
Convention is of great importance for areas that are not covered by Community law, 
such as those of the second and third pillar, since Directive 95/46/EC44 is a first pillar 
Directive, which application is excluded in relation to those areas. Furthermore, most of 
EU Member States, while transposing the Directive to their internal law, have extended 
the scope of the national data protection law to the areas excluded by the Directive (e.g. 
criminal law). In those cases, national law has to respect Convention no. 108. Apart 
from that, it is important to point out that, whereas if any legal problem arises 
concerning those areas the European Court of Justice can not intervene, it will be the 
European Court of Human Rights the one that would give an answer to any case of 
potential violation to Article 8 at national level.  
 
At EU level, the European Union Charter of Fundamental Rights45 has included in its 
scope not only the right to privacy but also the right to the protection of personal data as 
a distinct fundamental right: 
Article 7, Respect for private and family life:  
“Everyone has the right to respect for his or her private and family life, home 
and communications”. 
Article 8, Protection of personal data: 
 
“1. Everyone has the right to the protection of personal data concerning him or 
her. 2. Such data must be processed fairly for specified purposes and on the 
basis of the consent of the person concerned or some other legitimate basis laid 
down by law. Everyone has the right of access to data which has been collected 
concerning him or her, and the right to have it rectified. 3. Compliance with 
these rules shall be subject to control by an independent authority”. 
 
Even if, for the time being, the Charter is not legally binding, its philosophy affects the 
three pillars of EU law. The Charter stresses the nature of privacy and data protection as 
                                                 
43 Among others: Recommendation No.R(99) 5 for the protection of privacy on the Internet (23 February 
1999); Recommendation No.R(97) 18 on the protection of personal data collected and processed for 
statistical purposes (30 September 1997); Recommendation No.R(91) 10 on the communication to third 
parties of personal data held by public bodies (9 September 1991); Recommendation No.R(90) 19 on the 
protection of personal data used for payment and other operations  (13 September 1990); 
Recommendation No.R(87) 15 regulating the use of personal data in the police sector (17 September 
1987), etc. 
 
44 Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the 
protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such 
data, OJEC L 281 , 23/11/1995, p. 31 – 50, hereinafter: “the Directive”. 
 
45 Full text of the Charter of fundamental Rights of the European Union, OJEC C 364/1, 18-12-200: 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/justice_home/unit/charte/pdf/texte_en.pdf. See also: Article 29 Data Protection 
Working Party, Recommendation 4/99 on the inclusion of the fundamental right to data protection in the 




fundamental rights within the EU and individualize each one, pointing out their 
autonomy. That proves that they are essential concepts for the EU policy design, and 
constitute part of European public order.46  
 
Beyond Article 8 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms, which mentions only the right to privacy (even if the 
interpretation has extended it to “data protection”47), the EU Charter asserts that data 
subjects are protected not only as regards their sensitive data or intimacy but also 
concerning all their personal data (what is, indeed, an objective concept), not only 
against States’ action but also against private bodies. In order to ensure that protection  
the Charter does emphasise three main principles : 1. the absolute obligation to control 
the legitimate purposes pursued by the data controller; 2. the right of the data subject to 
access his own data and 3. the need for an independent authority to intervene in order to 
control the respect of the two first principles.48    
 
Furthermore, the draft Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe49 establishes in its 
Article 50 that : 
 
“1. Everyone has the right to the protection of personal data concerning him or 
her. 
2. A European law shall lay down the rules relating to the protection of 
individuals with regard to the processing of personal data by Union Institutions, 
bodies and agencies, and by the Member States when carrying out activities 
which come under the scope of Union law, and the rules relating to the free 
movement of such data.  Compliance with these rules shall be subject to the 




II.2. Legal basis to regulate on TBDF 
 
 
The first aspect to be considered is the legal basis to regulate the transfer of personal 
data made as a result of the requirements of US authorities, as well as the access to 
systems located in the EU from the US. 
 
                                                 
46  See on that point, our reflections published in Y. POULLET, “Pour une justification …”, op.cit., p. 
240 and ss.   
 
47 See: L. BYGRAVE “Data Protection Pursuant to the Right to Privacy in Human Rights Treaties”, 
International Journal of Law and Information Technology, vol. 6 no. 3. This paper examines the extent to 
which the basic principles of data protection laws may be read into provisions in human rights treaties 
proclaiming a right to privacy. 
 
48 For a more in-depth analysis of the articles 7 and 8 of the Charter and the significance of the distinction 
between data protection and privacy, Y. POULLET, “Pour une justification …”, op.cit., p. 277 and 278. 
 
49 Submitted to the President of the European Council in Rome on 18th July 2003, available at: 








Secondary legislation regulating the protection of privacy and personal data has been 
adopted in the context of the first pillar of EU law through two Directives: a general 
Directive 95/46/EC and a specific Directive 97/66/EC50 concerning the processing of 
personal data and the protection of privacy in the telecommunications sector (to be 
replaced by the privacy and electronic communications Directive 2002/58/EC in 31 
October 2003)51. 
 
Indeed, Directive 95/46/EC was passed with the objective of preventing Member States 
from restricting or prohibiting the free flow of personal data between them for reasons 
connected with the protection of fundamental rights and freedoms of natural persons, 
and in particular their right to privacy with respect to the processing of personal data. In 
order to achieve this goal it harmonises, to a certain extent, the rights and obligations in 
relation to the processing of personal data, creating a high standard of protection for 
personal data. 
 
It is clear that the general Directive is applicable to the processing of personal data 
(material scope of application52) carried out by airline companies (personal scope of 
application, being “data controllers”53) in the EU (spatial scope of application54). Then, 
if they proceed to transfer this data abroad, consideration has to be given to Articles 25 
and 26 of the Directive. 
 
Nevertheless, and given the particular nature of this TBDF, that is, not being made by 
the companies at their own initiative, but as a consequence of a mandatory requirement 
imposed by US authorities for the purpose of identifying individuals who may pose a 
threat to aviation safety or national security55, we may wonder whether Articles 25 and 
                                                 
50 Directive 97/66/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 December 1997 concerning 
the processing of personal data and the protection of privacy in the telecommunications sector; OJEC L 
024 , 30/01/1998, p. 1 – 8 
 
51 Directive 2002/58/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 July 2002 concerning the 
processing of personal data and the protection of privacy in the electronic communications sector, OJEC 
No L 201, 31 July 2002. Article 3 §1 states: “This Directive shall apply to the processing of personal data 
in connection with the provision of publicly available electronic communications services in public 
communications networks in the Community”. PNR system would not fall under this category. On the 
scope of application of the new Directive see: S. LOUVEAUX and MV. PEREZ ASINARI “New 
European Directive 2002/58/EC on the processing of personal data and the protection of privacy in the 
electronic communications sector. Some initial remarks”, Computers and Telecommunications Law 
Review, volume 9, issue 5, 2003, p. 133-138. 
 
52 Article 3 of the Directive. 
 
53 Article 2(d) of the Directive. 
 
54 Article 4.1(a) of the Directive. 
 
55 We will analyse the “purpose” infra. 
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26 of the Directive would be the proper legal basis to regulate the TBDF in this 
particular case, or whether it would be the only legal basis to tackle the requirements.  
 
Indeed, assessment would have to be made about the role that the second and/or third 
pillars (Titles V and VI of the TEU) of EU law would play in this context. 
Regarding the second pillar, in Article 11 of the TEU it is stated:  
“1. The Union shall define and implement a common foreign and security policy 
covering all areas of foreign and security policy, the objectives of which shall 
be:  
-to safeguard the common values, fundamental interests, independence and 
integrity of the Union in conformity with the principles of the United Nations 
Charter, 
-to strengthen the security of the Union in all ways, 
-to preserve peace and strengthen international security, in accordance with the 
principles of the United Nations Charter, as well as the principles of the 
Helsinki Final Act and the objectives of the Paris Charter, including those on 
external borders, 
-to promote international cooperation, 
-to develop and consolidate democracy and the rule of law, and respect for 
human rights and fundamental freedoms”. 
As far as the third pillar is concerned, Article 29 TEU states:  
“Without prejudice to the powers of the European Community, the Union's 
objective shall be to provide citizens with a high level of safety within an area of 
freedom, security and justice by developing common action among the Member 
States in the fields of police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters and by 
preventing and combating racism and xenophobia. 
That objective shall be achieved by preventing and combating crime, organised 
or otherwise, in particular terrorism,(…)”. 
If for the safeguarding of those objectives it would be considered necessary to enter into 
an agreement with the US, then, the way to instrument this decision would not be based 
on a Directive which legal basis is former Article 100A TEC (current Article 95 TCE), 
being a legal basis for Internal Market instruments. 
 
A very delicate question is then: would an agreement under Articles 24 or 38 TEU, 
which regulate the conclusion of international agreements when necessary for the 
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implementation of the respective Titles of the TEU, be necessary? In case of a positive 
answer, would this exclude the application of the Directive?  
 
In our opinion, the application of the Directive would not be excluded, since the bodies 
required to send passengers’ personal data are private bodies, which processing 
activities are regulated by this Directive. Even if an agreement under Articles 24 or 38 
TEU dealing with the transfer of personal data in the circumstances we are describing in 
the present article would be situated under the scope of Article 13.1 of the Directive 
(then processing activities would be legitimated under Article 7(c)), data controllers 
(airline companies) would not be exempted from all their obligations. We have to bear 
in mind that Article 13.1 does not exempt data controllers from the respect of Articles 8, 
17 and 18 of the Directive. That means that in the field of the airline companies 
responsibilities, obligations remain vis-à-vis the data subject. As a consequence, if they 
do not comply with those obligations while transferring data they could be declared 
liable.  
 
Furthermore, since the relationship between the passenger and the airline company is 
regulated, prima facie, by the Directive, and considering that we are dealing with a 
transfer that will be used in the context of CAPPS II to take “automated individual 
decisions”, attention has to be paid to Article 15 of the Directive, which has not been 
mentioned in Article 13.1 of the Directive either.  
 
However, and given the intricate characteristics of the situation we are commenting, 
additional actions would have to be taken, that will exceed the first pillar. Indeed, one 
may wonder whether the EU can accept that data with EU origin received by US 
authorities be used, for instance, as part of the evidence in a judicial process that might 
result in the death penalty56, or whether  “reciprocity”57 in the case of flights coming to 
the EU from the US under certain circumstances would be required, etc. Those issues, 
among others, might be the object of an international agreement based on Articles 24 or 
38 TEU58 that would complement the regulations of Directive 95/46/EC. (Indeed, it 
seems that the third pillar would have more relevance than the second one in this realm). 
                                                 
56 In this regard see the Article 13 of the Agreement on extradition between the European Union and the 
United States of America, OJEC L 181/27, 19.07.2003: “Capital punishment. Where the offence for 
which extradition is sought is punishable by death under the laws in the requesting State and not 
punishable by death under the laws in the requested State, the requested State may grant extradition on 
the condition that the death penalty shall not be imposed on the person sought, or if for procedural reasons 
such condition cannot be complied with by the requesting State, on condition that the death penalty if 
imposed shall not be carried out. If the requesting State accepts extradition subject to conditions pursuant 
to this Article, it shall comply with the conditions. If the requesting State does not accept the conditions, 
the request for extradition may be denied”. 
 
57 We read in the point (43) of the Undertakings of the United States Bureau of Customs and Border 
Protection and the United States Transportation Security Administration: “[i]n the event that the European 
Union decides to adopt an airline passenger identification system similar to that of the US Government, 
which requires all air carriers and GDSs to provide European authorities with access to PNR data for 
persons whose current travel itinerary includes a flight to, from, through or within the European Union, 
CBP and TSA would encourage US based airlines to cooperate”.  
 
58 The Europol Convention has its own regulation on personal data protection, as well as specific rules 
dealing with TBDF, requiring also “adequacy” in the third country in question.. See article 18 of the 




II.2.2. Which TBDF provision  is applicable under Directive 95/46/EC ? 
 
 
Considering that the Directive has to be applied to this case, Article 25.1 of the 
Directive has to be taken into account, since it sets out the principle that Member States 
shall only allow a transfer to take place if the third country in question ensures an 
“adequate” level of protection. The aim of this regulation is protecting data subjects’ 
rights and preventing circumvention of the rules contained in the Directive by sending 
personal data to countries where the rules are not as strict as in the EU or simply 
inexistent in order to carry out processing activities59.  
 
This general principle is softened in different ways by several provisions of the 
Directive. In the case of passengers’ data required by the US it is necessary to analyse 
what is the suitable legal mechanism to allow this procedure in a lawful way. We have 
to assess then, which are the derogations to the general principle, what are the 
characteristics of the US requirements60, and as a consequence which measures would 
the EU need to adopt. 
 
The notion of  “adequate” protection, though, has to be linked to the degree of risk a 
transfer presents and to the nature of the data. “The adequacy of the level of protection 
afforded by a third country shall be assessed in the light of all the circumstances 
surrounding a data transfer operation or set of data transfer operations; particular 
consideration shall be given to the nature of the data, the purpose and duration of the 
proposed processing operation or operations, the country of origin and country of final 
destination, the rules of law, both general and sectoral, in force in the third country in 




II.2.2.1. Is Article 26.1. applicable ? 
 
 
There are some cases in which a transfer or a set of transfers of personal data to a third 
country that does not ensure an adequate level of protection can take place. A set of 
                                                                                                                                               
the transfer of passengers’ data, as we have already said, EU public bodies do not intervene.  Yet, this 
Convention was adopted in the context of ex-Article K.3 (current 31 TEU), what reveals that the concept 
of “adequacy” is neither unknown nor irrelevant in the third pillar sphere.  
 
59 We have to bear in mind that otherwise, member States would be subject to liability for violation of the 
ECHR. See on that point, D. YERNAULT “L’efficacité de la Convention Européenne des Droits de 
l’homme…”, op. cit. 
 
60 In fact, this aspect goes beyond TBDF, and consist in an exploration concerning how far the 
requirements themselves will influence the legal basis: first pillar (Articles 25/26 or 4.1.(c) of the 
Directive), second pillar, third pillar of EU law. See infra for this analysis. 
 
61 Article 25.2 of the Directive. 
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derogations to the general principle is created by the Directive, so the transfer will be 
possible when: 
 
“(a) the data subject has given his consent unambiguously to the proposed 
transfer; or 
(b) the transfer is necessary for the performance of a contract between the data 
subject and the controller or the implementation of pre-contractual measures 
taken in response to the data subject's request; or 
(c) the transfer is necessary for the conclusion or performance of a contract 
concluded in the interest of the data subject between the controller and a third 
party; or 
(d) the transfer is necessary or legally required on important public interest 
grounds, or for the establishment, exercise or defence of legal claims; or 
(e) the transfer is necessary in order to protect the vital interests of the data 
subject; or 
(f) the transfer is made from a register which according to laws or regulations is 
intended to provide information to the public and which is open to consultation 
either by the public in general or by any person who can demonstrate legitimate 
interest, to the extent that the conditions laid down in law for consultation are 
fulfilled in the particular case.”62 
 
 
The use of those derogations would not be suitable for the case under analysis.63 If we 
consider paragraph (a), for instance, we know that “consent” should be “freely given” 
(among other characteristics that “consent” should fulfil to be considered valid), and 
this is not indeed the case here because airline companies are obliged to send the data. 
Furthermore, even if the relationship between the airline company and the passenger is 
of purely private order, where party autonomy prevails, a passenger can not agree with a 
company for something that the company is not free to do or not, and as a consequence, 
the rules of liability would not be the standard ones, but the exceptional ones (if the US 
government misuse the data transferred by the airline companies, and given the case that 
a data subject sue a company, the company will oppose an exception to its liability due 
to its mandatory public duties (factum principis). 
 
If we consider paragraph (d), its application will lead us to the rules contained in Article 
13.1 of the Directive. The said regulation provides that : 
 
“Member States may adopt legislative measures to restrict the scope of the 
obligations and rights provided for in Articles 6 (1), 10, 11 (1), 12 and 21 when 
such a restriction constitutes a necessary measures to safeguard: 
  (a)national security; 
                                                 
62 Article 26.1 of the Directive. 
 
63 The impossibility to use those derogations in the context of the transfer of travellers’ personal data by 
air companies to the US as a general rule has been clearly explained by the Article 29 Data Protection 
Working Party. See its Opinion 6/2002 on transmission of Passenger manifest Information and other data 





(d)the prevention, investigation, detection and prosecution of criminal offences, 
or breaches of ethic for regulated professions;  
(e)an important economic or financial interest of a Member sate or of the 
European Union, (…); 
(f)a monitoring, inspection or regulatory function connected, even occasionally, 
with the exercise of official authority in cases referred to in (c), (d) and (e); 
(g)the protection of the data subject or of the rights and freedoms of others.”64 
 
Then, it is required that the exception does not take place in a systematic fashion since 
exceptions are of restrictive interpretation and application. A hypothetical measure 
using this Article as legal basis to allow the application of the derogation contained in 
Article 26.1(d) would not be taken for the “national security” of a Member State, but for 
the compliance with the requirements of a third country “national security”, which does 
not seem to be the strict fundament for the exception as foreseen in the letter of the EU 
law. Furthermore, if any exception to the protection of data privacy is adopted respect 
has to be given to Article 8.2 of the European Convention on Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms, that is, the restriction must be adopted “in accordance with the 
law” and when “necessary in a democratic society”. Those requisites are, indeed, 
cumulative65. To use this exception a law should be passed (at national or supranational 
level), and the Member State or the EU would have the burden to prove that there is no 
other mean to safeguard the public interest at stake in a less-invasive-to-privacy way, or 
less violating of the data subject’ rights.66 
 
 
                                                 
 
64  See also Recitals 43, 44, and 45 of the Directive. 
 
65 “The interference was not therefore ‘in accordance with the law’ as required by the second paragraph of 
Article 8 and there has been a violation of this provision. In these circumstances, an examination of the 
necessity of the interference is no longer required”, European Court of Human Rights, case P.G. and J.H. 
v. The United Kingdom (Application n. 44787/98), Strasbourg, 25th  September 2001, p. 17. “The Court 
concludes that the interference cannot therefore be considered to have been ‘in accordance with the law’ 
since Swiss law does not indicate with sufficient clarity the scope and conditions of exercise of the 
authorities’ discretionary power in the area under consideration. (...) Having regard to the foregoing 
conclusion, the Court does not consider it necessary to examine whether the other requirements of 
paragraph 2 of Article 8 were complied with”, European Court of Human Rights, case Amann v. 
Switzerland (Application n. 27798/95), Strasbourg, 16th February 2000, p. 19. See also: Vincent 
COUSSIRAT-COUSTERE “Article 8 § 2”, in La Convention Européenne des Droits de l’Homme. 
Commentaire article par article, Louis PETTITI, Emmanuel DECAUX et Pierre IMBERT (eds),  
Economica, 2e Edition, Paris, 1999, p. 323-351. 
 
66 The same debate has been held as regards the exchange of personal data between Europol and the US 
just after the 11th of September tragic events. After long debate the JHA Council has approved a draft 
agreement between US and EU on 19th December 2002. On this agreement and certain concerns 
expressed on its legitimacy, see the report of the EU Network of Independent Experts in Fundamental 
Rights, “The Balance Between Freedom and Security in the Response by the European Union and its 
Member States to the Terrorist Threats”, Thematic Comment drafted upon request of the European 
Commission, DG Justice and Home Affairs, Unit A5, submitted on 31st March 2003, p. 24, available at: 
http://www.statewatch.org/news/2003/apr/CFR-CDF.ThemComment1.pdf , last visited 08/08/03. 
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II.2.2.2. Is Article 26.2. applicable ? 
 
 
Another alternative way for making a safe transfer is the use of contractual clauses.67 
They can be proposed by the controller (in this case, hypothetically, the airline 
company) to the member State Authority for approval, they can be elaborated by this 
Authority as  “standard contractual clauses” or even by the European Commission. This 
is the case of a Commission Decision on standard contractual clauses for the transfer of 
personal data to third countries (to controllers) under article 26.4 of Directive 95/46/EC 
68 and the Commission Decision on standard contractual clauses for the transfer of 
personal data to processors established in third countries, under Directive 95/46/EC69. 
  
However, given the specific circumstances of the case we are dealing with, this is not an 
appropriate way either, since the transfer of personal data is not being made on the basis 
of voluntary initiatives taken by the data exporter and the data importer, but rather from 
an obligation to transfer data arisen from US law that is imposed to airline companies. 
 
II.2.2.3. What about the application of the “Safe Harbour Principles” ? 
 
 
Apart from the derogations mentioned above, the European Commission may find that a 
third country ensures an adequate level of protection of personal data and issue a 
Decision declaring the “adequacy”, what will result in the free circulation of data in the 
circumstances described in the mentioned instrument. Given the remarkable different 
conception for the protection of personal data and privacy existent in the EU and the US 
it was not possible for the European Commission, even after long negotiations with US 
civil servants, to declare that the country regime, as a whole, assures an adequate level 
of protection. A partial solution was found with the adoption of the Agreement known 
as “Safe Harbour”70, which determines that an arrangement put in place by the US 
Department of Commerce provides adequate level of protection for personal data 
transferred from the EU. The results are the Safe Harbour principles, which are 
supplemented by FAQs (Frequently Asked Questions), published by the Department of 
Commerce.  
 
                                                 
67 Article 26.2 of the Directive. 
 
68 Commission Decision 2001/497/EC of 15 June 2001 on standard contractual clauses for the transfer of 
personal data to third countries, under Directive 95/46/EC - OJEC L 181/19 of 4.7.2001, available at:  
http://europa.eu.int/comm/internal_market/en/dataprot/news/1539en.pdf 
 
69 Commission Decision 2002/16/EC of 27 December 2001on standard contractual clauses for the transfer 
of personal data to processors established in third countries, under Directive 95/46/EC- OJEC L 006 of 
10.01.2002, p. 52 – 62, available at: 
http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/internal_market/en/dataprot/modelcontracts/02-16_en.pdf 
 
70 Commission Decision 2000/520/EC of 26.7.2000 pursuant to Directive 95/46/EC of the European 
Parliament and of the Council on the adequacy of the protection provided by the Safe Harbour privacy 
principles and related frequently asked questions issued by the US Department of Commerce - OJEC L 
215/7 of 25.8.2000. 
 
 20
Adherence to these principles is voluntary, but is only available for companies under the 
jurisdiction of certain public bodies that control the fairness of “commercial” practices. 
Indeed, European airline companies71 are not under the jurisdiction of those bodies. 
 
A specific agreement would be necessary for the transfer of air passengers’ data to US 
authorities. What should be the characteristics of this instrument? What are the main 
issues at stake? What is the state-of-the-art of the EU-US dialogue in this realm? We 
will address those issues in the following points. Notwithstanding, it is important to 




II.2.3. A crucial question : Article 4.1.c) or Article 25.1. ? 
 
 
Before going further, another relevant issue to discuss is: what kind of system will be/is 
being implemented by U.S. authorities to gain knowledge of passengers’ data? Even if 
we have been mentioning the fact of “transfers” so far, it has to be noted that  “transfer” 
(“push” system) is required to feed certain data bases such as APIS and that  direct 
“access” to PNR (“pull” system) is also required.  
 
The factual procedure (pull or push) will derive in a different legal regime to be applied. 
Whereas for the “push” system application of Articles 25 and 26 of the Directive has to 
be made, the “pull” system will configure the case described in Article 4.1.c) of the 
Directive, considering the presence of the connecting factor as described in this norm, 
what would certainly derived in the application of the Directive as a whole.72 
 
Article 4.1(c) foresees that the national law transposing the Directive is applicable to the 
processing of personal data where “the controller is not established on Community 
territory and, for the purposes of processing personal data makes use of equipment, 
automated or otherwise, situated on the territory of the said Member State, unless such 
equipment is used only for the purposes of transit through the territory of the 
Community”. 
 
Can US authorities, accessing PNR data stored in an on-line system situated in the 
territory of a Member State, be considered as “controller” of this data ? We know that 
                                                 
71 It has to be noted that not only European airline companies are subject to the Directive 95/46/EC, but 
every company processing personal data in the EU. 
 
72 The Article 29 Data Protection Working Party has expressed the same view in this particular issue. See 
Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Opinion 6/2002 on transmission of Passenger manifest 
Information and other data from Airlines to the United States, 24th October 2002, WP 66, p. 7. Article 29 
Data Protection Working Party, Opinion 4/2003 on the Level of Protection ensured in the US for the 
Transfer of Passengers’ Data, 13th June 2003, WP 78, p. 7. For a clarification on “applicable law” issues 
see: Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Working document on determining the international 
application of EU data protection law to personal data processing on the Internet by non-EU based web 
sites, 30 May 2002,  WP 56. See also, on the application of Article 4.1(c): MH. BOULANGER and C. de 
TERWANGNE “Internet et le respect de la vie privée”, in Cahiers du Centre de Recherches Informatique 
et Droit, n . 12, 1997, p. 211. 
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the controller is the person who “determines the purposes and means of the processing 
data”73. We could envisage that the purpose US authorities have for accessing to the 
PNR (access is a processing activity) be the fight against terrorism, and the means they 
decided to use for processing passengers’ data as one way to fight against terrorism be 
the PNR system. If the reasoning is made in that direction, that following the letter of 
the Directive and the interpretation of the Article 29 Data Protection Working Party can 
certainly be the case, then the controller (the US government), should  designate a 
representative established in the territory of the Member State where the equipment is 
located (Article 4.2 of the Directive), who should comply with the obligations foreseen 
in the Directive for data controllers (notification, information, security measures, etc.). 
 
We can see that the Joint Statement, elaborated by the European Commission and US 
Customs after the Talks on PNR transmission, has incorporated the following wording 
in point 5.1: “In accessing the PNR data in the territory of the Community, US Customs 
undertakes to respect the principles of the Data Protection Directive”74. Nevertheless, 
we could infer that the actual meaning of this phrase has not been fully considered since 
there is no evidence of a US will to designate a representative established in the territory 
of the EU (the relevant Member State) who will comply with the obligations above 
mentioned. Even if this “will” would exist, who would be the legitimate representative 
of the US government (who would be responsible in case of non-compliance)?75 May 
be, this would be another issue to consider in a third pillar agreement. 
 
After “accessing” to PNR, data will be transferred to the US to be integrated, for 
instance, into CAPPS II. This transfer will require application of Articles 25 and 26 (it 
has to be born in mind that, when Article 4.1(c) foresees the application of the Directive 
as a whole, it does not exclude the rules dealing with TBDF if following the use of 
equipment in the EU a transfer takes place). Then, an adequacy assessment will have to 
be made in this regard. 
 
 
II.2.4. Preliminary conclusions  
 
 
                                                 
73 Article 2(d) of the Directive. 
 
74 The Annex to the Joint Statement adds that “The United States Customs Service represents that: by 
legal state (title 49, United States Code, section 44909(c)(3)) and its implementing (interim) regulations 
(title 19, Code of Federal Regulations, section 122.49b), air carriers operating passenger flights in foreign 
air transportation to, from or through the United States, must provide with electronic access to PNR data 
contained in the automated reservation/ departure control systems (‘reservation systems’)”. In the 
following paragraphs the idea of “access” is reinforced: “with regard to the PNR data which Customs 
accesses directly from the air carrier’s reservation systems, Customs will only view PNR data concerning 
persons whose travel includes a flight into, out of or through the United States; Customs will access air 
reservation systems as an accommodation to the air carriers to obviate the need for costly technical 
changes required to allow the air carriers to transmit the data to Customs”. Italics have been added by the 
authors. 
 
75 This is a role that would certainly not be assumed by the US Embassy for reasons of Public 
International law. 
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To sum up, we can say that whereas Directive 95/46/EC is applicable to airline 
companies for regulating the requirements of US authorities regarding access and 
transfer of passengers’ data consideration would have to be given to the need of an 
agreement between the EU and the US in the field of the second or third pillars of EU 
law. Concerning the applicability of the Directive, if what is required is “access” to 
PNR, then Article 4.1(c) and 4.2 are the rules to be taken into account (plus Articles 25 
and 26, to cover the transfer to take place subsequently to the access). If, on the 
contrary, the requirements consist in the “transfer” of data (without direct access), 
Articles 25 and 26 will play their role. As far as the derogations to Article 25.1 are 
concerned, the most appropriate of them would be a Decision based on Article 25.6, 




II.3. Actions undertaken 
 
 
Quite rapidly after the US decisions concerning passengers’ data certain EU Data 
Protection Commissioners have expressed doubts and concerns about the compliance of 
the US requests with the EU Data Protection requirements. That lead to the delivery of a 
first Opinion by the Article 29 Data Protection Working Party taken on its own 
initiative76.  
 
More generally, the Working Party has issued a document on the need for a balance 
approach to the fight against terrorism77 where it stresses the need for respect all data 
protection principles in the legislation adopted and also expresses certain concern about 
the tendency to represent the protection of personal data as a barrier to the efficient fight 
against terrorism. “The Working Party underlines, in particular, the necessity to take 
into account the long term impact of urgent policies rapidly implemented or envisaged 
at this moment. This long-term reflection is all the more necessary in view of the fact 
that terrorism is not a new phenomenon and cannot be qualified as a temporary 
phenomenon. The Working Party also underlines the obligation to respect the principle 
of proportionality in relation to any measure restricting the fundamental right to privacy 
as required by Art. 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights and the relevant 
case-law. This implies inter alia, the obligation to demonstrate that any measure taken 
corresponds to a ‘imperative social need’. Measures which are simply ‘useful’ or 
‘wished’ may not restrict the fundamental rights and freedoms.(…)”. 
                                                 
76 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Opinion 6/2002 on transmission of Passenger manifest 
Information and other data from Airlines to the United States, 24th October 2002, WP 66, available at: 
http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/internal_market/en/dataprot/wpdocs-2002.htm  
 
77 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Opinion 10/2001 on the need for a balanced approach in the 
fight against terrorism, 14th December 2001, WP 53, available at: 
http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/internal_market/privacy/docs/wpdocs/2001/wp53en.pdf  
 See also: EU Network of Independent Experts in Fundamental Rights, “The Balance Between Freedom 
and Security in the Response by the European Union and its Member States to the Terrorist Threats”, 
Thematic Comment drafted upon request of the European Commission, DG Justice and Home Affairs, 





A Joint Statement78 was signed between the European Commission and US Customs, 
following high level officials’ talks on PNR transmission. Certain undertakings were 
asked to US authorities in order to comply with the Data Protection Directive. 
Furthermore, full exercise of the US Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) in connection 
with the data collected by US authorities in order to provide  access to data by EU  data 
subjects, as well as certain limits as regards the transmission of PNR data by the US 
Customs and TSA to other US administrations were agreed.  
 
Beyond these minimal points of agreement it was explicitly foreseen that other 
safeguards will be proposed by US through additional undertakings in such a way that 
adequate protection might be offered to personal data with EU origin and that the 
European Commission will be able to issue a Decision under Article 25.6 of the 
Directive.79  
 
The validity of the legal basis of this Joint Statement has been seriously challenged by 
S. Rodota, chairman of the Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, through a letter to 
the Chair of the EU Parliament’s Committee on Citizen’s Freedoms and Rights dated 
3th March 2003. 80 
 
The European Parliament has broadly echoed those concerns.81 A document82 has been 
delivered stressing not only the prima facie lack of adequate protection offered by the 
US regulatory system but also denouncing the European Commission’s failure, as the 
guardian of the Treaties and Community law, to assume its responsibilities in full in that 
“it needs to verify whether there is a real basis in US law to justify access to reservation 
systems’ data or whether this is an over-broad interpretation on the part of the present 
Administration (…); it is continuing to postpone the verification of the US legislation 
required under Article 25 of Directive 95/46/EC (…); last but not least, it is failing to 
provide information to the public, who should be the first to know what is being done 
with information about them; (…)”.83 It is important to point out that the Parliament, 
                                                 
78 The Joint Statement has been published on the website of the European Commission (DG External 
Relations): European Commission: US Customs talks on PNR transmission, Joint Statement, Brussels, 
17/18 February 2003, available at: http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/us/intro/pnr.htm 
 
79 At the longer run, both parties agreed on the necessity of a multilateral agreement under the umbrella of 
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO). 
 
80 The letter recalls that national Data Protection Authorities are not free to apply or not the data 
protection legislation and “it has not yet been clarified how the Joint Statement might provide a sound 
legal basis to justify an exception to the rule.” 
 
81 Different hearings have been held by the Committee on Citizens’ Freedoms and Rights, Justice and 
Home Affairs. The first one took place on 25th March 2003 ; another one on 6th May 2003. 
 
82 European Parliament, Motion for a Resolution on transfer of personal data by airlines to the US 
immigration service, 6th March 2003, B5-0000/2003. 
 
83 European Parliament, Motion for a Resolution…, p. 3. 
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despite having regard to Directive 95/46/EC, it expresses being “surprised that these 
issues have not been considered in the context of the agreements on judicial and police 
cooperation, (…)”, what would let us infer that a double approach (first and third pillar) 
is being envisaged for the subject matter.  
 
In order to prepare the Commission’s Decision under article 25.6 the Article 29 Data 
Protection Working Party issued a second Opinion on 13th June 200384. This Opinion 
examines to what extent the US decisions are offering an adequate protection. In what 
follows we will analyse the principles that should be taken into account when adopting 
an Adequacy Decision, assessing the way the problems arising in this particular realm 




III.  Certain considerations for an “adequacy” assessment  
 
 
This part of the paper does not intend to provide for a complete adequacy assessment 
for the transfer of passengers’ data from the EU to the US. It only points out some 
specific issues that can present certain problems. 
 
It is clear that the Joint Statement has no legal value,85 but it is a first step in a dialogue 
at political level. It does not cover a full analysis of the principles described in the 
Working Document no. 12 elaborated by the Article 29 Working Party.86 We will try to 
make an approximation to the principles described in this Working Document, vis-à-vis 
the Joint Statement and the Undertakings87 (indeed, the statements made in these 
documents are related to the “access” to PNR data. We insist on the point that in this 
case the Directive as a whole has to be applied due to Article 4.1(c)), in the light of the 
requirements contained in the Aviation and Transportation Security Act, as well as of 
certain recent documents dealing with CAPPS II. 
 
As we have already mentioned, the Joint Statement says “(a) [i]n accessing the PNR 
data in the territory of the Community, US Customs undertakes to respect the principles 
of the Data Protection Directive”. The analysis to be made in this regard is what kind of 
access can be admitted, which part of PNR can be made available to US authorities, 
                                                 
84 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Opinion 4/2003 on the Level of Protection ensured in the US 
for the Transfer of Passengers’ Data, 13th June 2003, WP 78, available at: 
http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/internal_market/en/dataprot/wpdocs-2003.htm  
 
85 The sources of Community law are strictly described in Article 249 of the TEC. 
 
86 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Working Document: Transfers of personal data to third 




87 Undertakings of the United States Bureau of Customs and Border Protection and the United States 




how the Standard Query Language (SGL) will be designed to restrict or filter the access, 
who will be the representative of the US government in the EU (Article 4.2 of the 
Directive).  
 
Having said that, and considering that the processing activities to carry out are not only 
“access” but also “transfer” of the results for further matching at CAPPS II level, 
respect will have to be given to Articles 25 and 26 of the Directive. Given the analysis 
we have made supra, the appropriate tool for the transfer will be an Adequacy Decision 
under Article 25.6. The documents reflect a discussion at “adequacy” level, that is, the 
principles to comply with for an Adequacy Decision, yet there is a complete lack of 
reference to how compliance with the Directive as a whole will be assured (Articles 
4.1(c) and 4.2 of the Directive). 
 
On the other side, the transfer of passengers and crew manifests are not dealt in those 
documents, whilst it is clear that an “adequacy” assessment and Decision is absolutely 
necessary in this realm for a legal transfer. In order to structure this adequacy 
assessment we take  as point of departure the three main principles enacted by the EU 
Charter of Human Rights already evoked: 
 
“(…)2.Such data must be processed fairly for specified purposes and on the 
consent of the person concerned or some legitimate basis laid down by law.2. 
Everyone has the right of access to data which has been collected concerning 
him or her, and the right to have it rectified. 3. Compliance with these rules 




• The legitimate basis and “purpose limitation” principle: 
 
 
-The legitimate basis : 
 
 
According to the Article 8 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms a legal and fully transparent legal basis must exist 
for justifying  a data processing limiting privacy rights. This requirement is not fulfilled 
in the case insofar the US decisions, that is to say the Undertakings, are not at this stage 
legally binding and that there is no clear view from the European point of view of all the 
regulations which are surrounding the multiple data processing generated by the PNR 
flows.  
 
Furthermore, considering that these purposes are determined in a state of “emergency”, 
it would be necessary to add a “sunset clause”. Indeed, geopolitical situations88 can 
                                                 
88 See the proceedings of the Conference “Les attentats du 11 septembre 2001: Conséquences 
géopolitiques mondiales et lutte anti-terroriste”, Département culturel des Facultés Universitaires Notre-
Dame de la Paix de Namur, November 2001. 
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change very fast, and the purposes for the collection of data that are based in those 
situations would need to be adapted. 
 
More fundamentally certain doubts might be expressed as regards the requirement of 
“specificity”, which is a hard core principle established by the case law of the European 
Court of Human Rights89 grounded on Article 8 of the ECHR. Any extensive 
exploratory or general surveillance of data90 is prohibited; the circumstances under 
which the processing of the data can take place must be specified and the conditions to 
which it is subject must be identified with sufficient precision.  
 
 
- the unspecified purpose : 
 
 
The Joint Statement does not specify the purpose for the transmission of  passengers’ 
data. Point 6 states that “[i]t was agreed that the information and undertakings to be 
provided would need to cover in particular: definition of the purposes for which the data 
will be used and limitation of the use of these purposes; (…)”. Point 5(e) expresses that 
“US Customs may provide information to other US law enforcement authorities only 
for purposes of preventing and combating terrorism and other serious criminal offences, 
who specifically request PNR information from US Customs”.  
 
The Annex to the Joint Statement declares that “The United States Customs represents 
that: (…) PNR data is used by Customs strictly for enforcement purposes, including use 
in threat analysis to identify and interdict potential terrorists and other threats to national 
and public security, and to focus Customs resources on high risk concerns, (…)”. 
 
The Aviation and Transportation Security Act (ATSA) §114(h)(4) specifies that “In 
consultation with the Transportation Security Oversight Board, the Under Secretary 
shall (…) consider requiring passenger air carriers to share passenger lists with 
appropriate Federal agencies for the purpose of identifying individuals who may pose a 
threat to aviation safety or national security”. 
 
There is an urgent need to define the terms used both by US Regulations and the Joint 
Statement as an answer, not only to the purpose limitation principle contained in 
European data protection regulations, but more generally to the legality principle of 
criminal law. 
 
What is “terrorism”?91 What are the “other serious criminal offences”? What has to be 
understood by “threat to aviation safety or national security”? How the “potentiality” to 
                                                 
89 This principle has been constantly repeated by the European Court of Human Rights in what concerns 
electronic surveillance and wire tapping [see notably recently, Klass and others v. Germany (Series A n. 
28), Strasbourg 6th September 1978, Khan v. U.K (Application n. 35394/97) Strasbourg  12th May 2000] 
 
90 The European Court of Human Rights has developed its case-law particularly as regards the monitoring 
of communications, but it seems to us that the same reasoning might be done as regards other data. 
  
91It should be clear, before any decision be adopted by EU authorities, which is the definition of 
“terrorism” and any other relevant concept mentioned as the purposes of US authorities for the processing 
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be a terrorist will be determined? What kind of parameters will be used? Then, would 
the purpose of “preventing and combating terrorism and other serious criminal 
offences” be broadened by the consideration of the purpose expressed in the ATSA? 
Which other US statute contains purposes for which PNR data or passengers’ and crew 
manifests may be used92?  
 
 
-The “data quality and proportionality” principle: 
 
 
Data has to be accurate and kept updated. Consideration has to be given, for instance, to 
the US legislation that determines lists of terrorist groups. Normally, the data on 
passengers is controlled using those lists. However, the integration of those lists may 
generate certain concerns. This question has been posed by a Member of the Belgian 
Parliament in the Hearing organised in June 200193.  
                                                                                                                                               
of personal data with EU origin. This issue seems to be problematic even in the EU side: “[n]either 
international legal instruments, nor the Framework Decision of the Council on 13th June of 2002 
concerning the fight against terrorism have really succeed in overcoming the difficulties traditionally 
encountered when attempting to give a definition of terrorism which describes its specificity, compared to 
other forms of organized crime in relation to all its possible forms. However, a sufficiently exact 
definition of the offence of terrorism is a prerequisite not only for specific indictment, but also for the 
application of specific procedural rules, particularly in the context of the inquiry of the investigation, and 
even more so for special forms of detention; otherwise the measures adopt in the fighting terrorism will 
lack clear legal basis, potentially bringing into question their lawfulness”. EU Network of Independent 
Experts in Fundamental Rights, “The Balance Between Freedom and Security in the Response by the 
European Union and its Member States to the Terrorist Threats”, Thematic Comment drafted upon 
request of the European Commission, DG Justice and Home Affaires, Unit A5, submitted on 31st March 
2003, p. 7. See the analyses on this specific problem made in pages 11-16.  See the definitions given in 
Articles 1 and 2 by the Framework Decision of 13 June 2002 on combating terrorism, OJCE L 164, 
22.6.2002, p.4.  See also the Opinion of the Economic and Social Committee on the ‘Commission 
Working Document – The relationship between safeguarding internal security and complying with 
international protection obligations and instruments’, 2002/C 149/09, OJCE C 149, 21.6.2002, specially 
points 2.7, 2.9, 2.1. A draft global Convention against terrorism is currently being negotiated within the 
United Nations. 
 
92  Certain concerns might be expressed about the possible use of PNR records for ensuring  a better 
control on immigration ( see the possible links with the USVISIT program ).  
 
93 “Cependant, il demande si cette loi ne contient pas une certaine forme de rigidité? [question of a 
Member of the Parliament in conection to the list of terrorist orgnizations contained in the Antiterrorism 
and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, as described by Mme Sandra Fowler, legal counsel of the 
Federal Bureau of Investigations –FBI- at the American Embassy] N’y a-t-il pas un risqué par rapport à 
des organisations terroristes qui ne seraient pas mentionnées dans cette loi et auxquelles le dispositif ne 
s’appliquerait pas ? N’y a-t-il pas également des organisations qui disparaissent progressivement ou qui 
évoluent ? À titre d’exemple, il cite l’OLP, qui, voici quinze ou vingt ans, aurait certainement figuré sur 
cette liste alors qu’aujourd’hui cette organisation est reconnue comme le représentant du peuple 
palestinien. Il y a donc des organisations qui ont évolué sur le plan politique et qui ont développe des 
relations avec les autorités politiques de nos pays”, Sénat de Belgique, Session 2000-2001, 2-774/1, 
Rapport fait au nom de la Commission de l’Intérieur et des Affaires Administratives par M. Wille, II. 
Auditions d’experts étrangers, 4. Echange de vues, p. 31. On the EU side, lists including persons and 
entities linked to terrorism are being made. See: Council Regulation (EC) No 2580/2001 of 27 December 
2001 on specific restrictive measures directed against certain persons and entities with the view to 
combating terrorism, OJEC L 344, 28.12.2001. Article 2.3 states that “The Council, acting by unanimity, 
shall establish, review and amend the list of persons, groups and entities to which this Regulation applies, 
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Another concern is expressed by Hasbrouck regarding the quality of the data to be 
gathered in the context of CAPPS II.94 Within this system, passengers data will be 
confronted with data coming from other sources, particularly with the FBI’s data base 
on outstanding warrants for crime and violence. As regards this data base the FBI has 
explicitly asserted that it has no obligation to ensure the accuracy of the data so 
processed. Therefore it might happen that a travel would be denied to a person under the 
basis of  a false information.   
 
The exaggerate duration of the data storage has created serious concerns regarding 
CAPPS II. However, it seems that the doubts have been, to a certain extent, dissipated 
(see supra point I.2).  Nevertheless, clarification has to be given regarding APIS. 
 
The principle under analysis is in direct interdependence with the “purpose limitation” 
one, since whether the data processed is adequate, relevant and not excessive can only 
be determined in relation to the purpose.  
 
Special attention has to be paid to sensitive data,95 and the definition given to this 
concept. For instance, the definition given in the Safe Harbour Agreement differs from 
the one contained in the Directive. It is expected that in the future Agreement 
concerning passengers’ data  respect be given to the definition of he Directive. The 
Undertakings express that “CBP and TSA are committed to filtering sensitive data 
(…)”.96 Specifications will have to be given concerning the characteristics of the filters 
to be implemented or design of SQL.  
                                                                                                                                               
(…)”. This activities will be laid down in accordance with the Article 1(4), (5) and (6) of the Council 
Common Position of 27 December 2001 on the application of specific measures to combat terrorism, 
OJEC L 344 , 28.12.2001, where we can read: “4. The list in the Annex shall be drawn up on the basis of 
precise information or material in the relevant file which indicates that a decision has been taken by a 
competent authority in respect of the persons, groups and entities concerned, irrespective of whether it 
concerns the instigation of investigations or prosecution for a terrorist act, an attempt to perpetrate, 
participate in or facilitate such an act based on serious and credible evidence or clues, or condemnation 
for such deeds. Persons, groups and entities identified by the Security Council of the United Nations as 
being related to terrorism and against whom it has ordered sanctions may be included in the list. 
For the purposes of this paragraph "competent authority" shall mean a judicial authority, or, where 
judicial authorities have no competence in the area covered by this paragraph, an equivalent competent 
authority in that area. 
5. The Council shall work to ensure that names of natural or legal persons, groups or entities listed in the 
Annex have sufficient particulars appended to permit effective identification of specific human beings, 
legal persons, entities or bodies, thus facilitating the exculpation of those bearing the same or similar 
names. 
6. The names of persons and entities on the list in the Annex shall be reviewed at regular intervals and at 
least once every six months to ensure that there are grounds for keeping them on the list”.  
It is not clear then who is the independent authority that monitors that the activities described are carried 
out with respect of Convention no. 108. 
 
94 E.HASBROUCK, “What’s wrong with CAPPS-II ?”, available at : http://hasbrouck.org/articles 
/CAPPS-II.html , last visited 18/08/03. 
 
95 Even if the WP n. 12 does not include it in this principle we can certainly connect it with the 
“proportionality principle”. 
 
96 Undertakings, point (8). 
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It is further stated that “[w]ith respect to sensitive PNR data that has been transferred by 
air carriers to CBP, should it become necessary for CBP to use such sensitive data for 
purposes of preventing and combating terrorism and serious criminal offences, any such 
use will be subject to specific approval procedures, involving the US Deputy 
Commissioner of CBP, in consultation with the DHS Chief Privacy Officer”.97 Can the 
EU accept this statement, considering that if these data has already been transferred, it 
was made in violation to the Directive? 
 
The proportionality principle assessment, that is whether the data is adequate, relevant 
and not excessive, has to be complemented by a “necessity test”, which normally 
evaluates to what extent the data kept is the only suitable and available mean for the 
assurance of the purpose followed. The data is “necessary” if there is no other mean, 
less invasive, to reach that purpose. The obligation under article 8 of the ECHR to adopt 
the less privacy intrusive measure has to be recalled in that context.  
 
It is not possible to make a general statement about the implications of the “pull” and 
the “push” systems because the risks created for the protection of personal data depend 
on the modalities of implementation of those systems. For instance, it is obvious that if 
what US authorities require is  “full” access to PNR data, this system would be certainly 
far less respectful of data protection rights than the “transfer” of passengers’ and crew 
manifests, since the amount of data available would be limited in the second case, it 
would not include sensitive data, etc. However, if we think about the SQL, and the fact 
that code can be created to determine not only “who” is authorized to access, but also 
“what” he is entitled to do (only reading, reading and copy, etc) and regarding “which 
data” (the whole data base, only certain information, about certain persons, etc.), we can 
see that it can be an interesting way to limit access to sensitive data, or other data 
considered excessive. Furthermore, it would be possible to check whether unauthorized 
bodies or persons gain access by analysing the logfiles of the system. 
 
In this regard, it would be also necessary to include a “sunset clause” to evaluate how 
the limits to the data protection rights created by those systems effectively contribute to 
the fight against terrorism.  
 
 
-Restrictions on onward transfers: 
 
 
The Decision to be adopted by the European Commission should be specific concerning 
the bodies (public or private) entitled to receive passengers data and the responsibility 
they have. The Joint Statement is quite vague when saying: “(…) other law enforcement 
entities may specifically request PNR information from Customs and Customs, in its 
discretion, may provide such information for national security or in furtherance of other 
legitimate law enforcement purposes; for purposes of regulating the dissemination of 
PNR data which may be shared with other law enforcement entities, Customs is 
                                                                                                                                               
 
97 Undertakings, point (9). 
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considered the ‘owner’ of the data and such entities are obligated by the terms of 
disclosure to obtain Customs express authorization for any further dissemination 
(sometimes referred to as the ‘Third Agency Rule’); (…)”. 
 
Again, the problem of purpose limitation is present here, “other legitimate law 
enforcement purposes” is really a very wide purpose that can include any kind of crime, 
which potentially violates the proportionality principle. 
 
 
• The Right to  a transparent and secure processing 
 
 
-The “transparency” principle: 
 
 
Passengers have to be provided with information about the purpose of the processing, 
their rights, as well as which US agencies are entitled to have access to their personal 
data.  The application of this principle can be limited pursuant to Article 13 of the 
Directive. Any limitation to the right to be informed pursuant to Article 13.1 has to be 
clearly stated in order to evaluate the proportionality of the measure. Moreover, “[t]he 
Working Party underlines the necessity to have commitments from the US side that are 
officially published at least at the level of the Federal Register and fully binding on the 
US side”.98   
 
 
-The “security” principle :  
 
 
The Annex to the Joint Statement specifies certain characteristics of the security 
measures. The measures mentioned are those adopted by Customs, but the document is 
silent concerning the measures adopted by the other bodies to whom data are likely to 
be transferred/shared with. 
  
 
-The “rights of access, rectification and opposition”: 
 
 
The Joint Statement affirms that “[a]s concerns a first party request for disclosure of 
data by the data subject, US Customs will proceed with disclosure under the Freedom of 
Information Act (FOIA)”. It would be advisable to create a standard form for access 
request under the FOIA with translation to every Community language, considering that 
not every data subject who travels to the US, and whose data is required in a mandatory 
way, speaks English, though is able to understand how his rights can be enforced under 
the FOIA. Translation of the information contained, and to be given as a result of an 
                                                 
98 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Opinion 4/2003 on the Level of Protection ensured in the US 




access request, would have to be assured as well, otherwise the data subject who does 
not speak English will be unable to realize whether he has to exercise his right to 
rectification or not. 
 
Moreover, the Article 29 Data Protection Working Party99 has expressed concern about 
the likelihood of the FOIA being used by third parties to access PNR data held by the 
US administration. This possibility has to be prevented. 
 
 
• Independent authority and enforcement mechanisms : 
 
 
There is a lack of clarity concerning what would be the legal remedies available to 
European data subjects to enforce their rights and obtain redress if necessary. Travelers 
do not only need to know what are the remedies but also how affordable they are and 
what kind of assistance they are entitled to receive from public bodies. The system of 
State liability for misuse of data with EU origin has to be described in the document to 
be signed. 
 
There is a strong need of an “independent body” to control the respect of the data 
protection rules regarding EU passengers’ data. Indeed, doubts remain concerning the 




Conclusions    
 
 
The Joint Statement and the Undertakings are obviously insufficient to regulate TBDF 
of passengers’ data, both from a formal (they are not a source of Community law) and 
content (they are far from covering the requirements for an adequacy Decision) point of 
view. 
 
Concerning the legal basis for EU actions, we reiterate what we have already expressed 
in the preliminary conclusions, a complementary approach between first and third 
pillars would have to be developed. Furthermore, whereas “access” should be ruled in 
the light of Article 4.1.(c) of the Directive, “transfer” has to be ruled under Article 25 
and 26. However, an adequacy Decision (Article 25.6) would be required to regulate 
transfers in both cases (in the case of an integral application of the Directive, as a result 
of the “transfer” made of “accessed” PNR data). 
 
The way “access” is operated has to be thoroughly described, and limitations must be 
established concerning the categories of bodies/persons authorized, the categories of 
data that will be disclosed, and what will be the security measures to be implemented. 
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Among others, controls in logfiles will allow to make a follow-up of how “access” is 
exercised.  
 
The purpose has to be delimited as precisely as possible, since many other parameters of 
an adequacy assessment have to be regarded vis-à-vis this principle (e.g. proportionality, 
transparency, security, etc.). 
 
We insist on the fact that being the fight against terrorism and the protection to the right 
of individuals to be safe legitimate purposes, the Directive and the European 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms give legal 
instruments to balance the rights to privacy and personal data protection with them. The 
balance of conflicting rights in accordance to the law (say, respecting the legal 
parameters to proceed to limit any right) is one of the basis of the democratic system. 
The conflicting interests have to be interpreted, and the balance has to be made, in 
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In the aftermath of the events of 11 September
2001, decisions have been taken unilaterally by US
authorities requiring air line companies to provide
direct access or transfer of data concerning
passengers and cabin crews flying to, from or
within the US to certain US administrations. These
decisions have been challenged by EU authorities
insofar they constitute a violation of EU privacy
and personal data protection law which is
considered to be of public order. The debate is still
pending. This article will comment on this complex
and multi-featured discussion opposing two
fundamental societal values: on the one hand, the
right of the citizens to be protected from terrorism
and the obligation of a sovereign State to fight
against it and safeguard public security,1 and on the
other hand, the individuals’ right to personal data
protection and privacy and the obligation of the
EU, in the light of international and supranational
commitments, to protect them in this arena. After a
short presentation of the US decisions and their
context, the authors will analyse the EU position,
its claim for adequate personal data protection to
be ensured by the US authorities and the legal
grounds for this position. Finally, a synthetic
approach to the adequacy of the US decisions vis-à-
vis the EU legal provisions will be proposed. 
A. The US legal framework
1. The legislative context
Directly after the tragedy of 11 September 2001, the
US Government took a great amount of initiatives to
fight against terrorism. The Patriot Act,2 which is
commonly known, is one example. However, more
specific legislation has been enacted as well, in order
to tackle the risks created by the terrorist threat.
In the immigration and admission of aliens
sphere, the Enhanced Border Security and Visa
Entry Reform Act3 was enacted on 14 May 2002.
As regards air transportation, the US adopted the
Aviation and Transportation Security Act (ATSA)4
on 19 November 2001. This Act has been followed
by secondary regulations, notably the document
“Passenger and Crew Manifests Required for
Passengers Flights in Foreign Air Transportation to
the United States”, published in the Federal
Register on 31 December 2001,5 and the document
“Passenger Name Record Information Required
for Passengers on Flights in Foreign Air
Transportation to or from the United States,”
published in the Federal Register on 25 June 2002.6
The main purpose of all this legislation is to
enhance security for the fight against terrorism
and create what the US authorities have called a
“21st Century Smart Border”.7 In order to achieve
this goal, the Government and Parliament have
given a very large mandate to a new public body:
the Transportation Security Agency (TSA), which
is part of the Department of Homeland Security,8
to take appropriate measures in order to improve
aviation security. 
One of the most important decisions taken in
this context was to use information technology,
particularly risk analysis tools, for detecting
terrorists. All the data transmitted by the air
transportation companies will be centralized in a
large database, operated both by US Customs and
Immigration and Naturalization Services.
Furthermore, a Computer Assisted Passenger Pre-
screening Program (CAPPS II) is created to
evaluate all passengers before they board an
aircraft. We will comment more extensively on
these initiatives in what follows. 
2. The measures
The above referred regulations have created
different obligations for air carriers, which derive
also in different information management systems,
either centralized or not.
The Advanced Passenger Information System
(APIS) deals with all the data requested from and
transmitted by all air transportation companies.
The ATSA stipulates the following: 
(1) IN GENERAL - Not later than 60 days after
the date of enactment of the Aviation and
Transportation Act, each air carrier and foreign air
carrier operating a passenger flight in foreign ain
transportation to the United States shall provide to
the Commissioner of Customs by electronic
transmission a passenger and crew manifest
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containing the information specified in paragraph
(2). Carriers may use the advanced passenger
information system established under section 431 of
the tariff Act of 1930 (19 U.S.C. 1431) to provide the
information required by the preceding sentence.
(2) INFORMATION - A passenger and crew
manifest for a flight required under paragraph (1)
shall contain the following information:
 The full name of each passenger and crew
member.
 The date of birth and citizenship of each
passenger and crew member.
 The sex of each passenger and crew
member.
 The passport number and country of
issuance of each passenger and crew member if
required for travel.
 The United States visa number or resident
alien card number of each passenger and crew
member, as applicable.
 Such other information as the Under
Secretary, in consultation with the Commissioner
of Customs, determines is reasonably necessary to
ensure aviation safety.9
Paragraph (4) establishes that the passenger
and crew manifest shall be transmitted to the
Customs Service in advance of the aircraft landing
in the US.10 Furthermore, the following paragraph
regulates on PNR:
(3) PASSENGER NAME RECORDS - The carriers
shall make passenger name record information
available to Customs Service upon request.11
As we have already seen, certain documents have
been published in the Federal Register specifying
these regulations. The Interim rule of 31 December
2001 has extended the required data elements for the
manifests, for instance, by adding the obligation to
transmit electronically to Customs: 
(3) [t]he foreign airport where each passenger
began his air transportation to the United States;
for each passenger and crew member destined to
the United States, the airport in the United States
where the passenger and crew member will
process through Customs and Immigration
formalities; and for each passenger and crew
member transiting through the United States and
not clearing through Customs and Immigration
formalities, the foreign airport of final destination
for the passenger and crew member.12
In what concerns PNR, the Interim rule of 25
June 2002 states, among other issues, that: 
[i]n order to readily provide Customs with
such access to requested PNR data, each air carrier
must ensure that its electronic
reservation/departure control systems correctly
interface with the US Customs data Center,
Customs Headquarters.13
It is clear then, that these data will not be
“transferred” (as a first step, see infra) but directly
“accessed” on-line.
The Interim rule we are commenting upon
further mentions, “merely to be illustrative”,
certain data elements to which Customs may
request access in relation to a passenger:14
 Last name; first name; date of birth;
address(es); and phone number(s);
 Passenger name record locator (reservation)
number;
 Reservation date (or dates, if multiple
reservations made), or if no advance
reservation made (“go show”);
 Travel agency/agent, if applicable;
 Ticket information;
 Form of payment for ticket;
 Itinerary information;
 Carrier information for the flight, including but
not limited to: carrier information for each
segment of the flight if not continuous; the
flight number(s); and date(s) of intended travel;
 Seating; and
 PNR history.15
Indeed, PNR data contains other information,
some of them of a sensitive nature. PNR, for
instance, stores the requested kind of food for the
flight (this food can have health, philosophical or
religious connotations), whether any facilities for
the disabled are needed,16 etc. It also stores who
will pay for the bill (company, association,
university, public body, party, etc.) and even in
relation to which internal account (what is
normally connected to a specific client, project,
etc.). The itinerary field includes all air space and
related non-airline, auxiliary services the passenger
requested.17
Another system to be implemented is the US
VISIT,18 which consists of a systematic scanning of
the travel documents of each US visitor. Photo and
fingerprints will be taken and the data so obtained
will be checked against lists of those who should be
denied entry within the US territory for different
reasons (terrorism, criminal violations, illegal entry,
visa violations).19 This system will permit the central
processing of personal data including certain data
based on biometric features20 (today digital photo
PNR data contains
other information,
some of them of
a sensitive nature
100
and fingerprints; tomorrow facial recognition and iris
scans).21 In order to facilitate this work, visa waiver
countries are required to use tamper-proof passports
that include biometric identifiers from August 2004.
This data will not be requested from airline
companies so we will not develop this aspect in the
present paper. However, we are of the opinion that its
existence had to be mentioned here insofar as US
regulations would permit interconnections between
the PNR data and the data generated in the context
of the US VISIT program.
The TSA is authorized, apart from to use the
data collected through these two sources, to
establish a “watch-list” of individuals suspected of
posing “a risk of air piracy or terrorism or a threat
to airline or passenger safety”.22 Furthermore, the
different airline companies are operating the
Computer Assisted Pre-screening Program
(CAPPS), a passenger–screening tool, in order to
identify passengers for enhanced screening before
their boarding. 
An updated version of CAPPS,23 CAPPS II, is
presently being developed for providing a more
efficient identification of terrorist risks:
Essentially, CAPPS II process will be a passive
system that produces a general indication of the
level of terrorist risk each airline passenger might
pose to civil aviation security. It will be activated by
a traveller’s airline reservation request. Airlines will
ask passengers for specific reservation information
that will include passenger’s full name, plus other
identifiers including date of birth, home address
and home phone number. Passengers will not be
asked to provide social security numbers, and TSA
will not look at credit worthiness. The CAPPS II
process will then authenticate each passenger’s
identity through publicly and commercially
available databases. Once a passenger’s identity is
authenticated and the passenger’s information is
run against terrorist or appropriate Federal
Government systems, an aggregate numerical
threat score will be generated that TSA will use to
determine which passengers should proceed
through the ordinary screening process and which
passengers should be asked to a somewhat more
thorough screening. In extremely rare cases, the
system may identify an individual who is a known
foreign terrorist or the associate of a known
foreign terrorist. In such a case, law enforcement
authorities would be notified and given the
opportunity to take appropriate action.24
All these systems will be operated under the
control of the TSA. Privacy issues are not absent
of the implementation of all these systems. The
administrator of the TSA, James M. Loy, said that
the TSA is taking privacy issues into account as it
develops CAPPS II: 
CAPPS II will operate under a stringent privacy
protection protocol being developed through
discussions with privacy groups (…). Strict firewalls
and access rules will protect a traveller’s information
from inappropriate use, sharing, or disclosure.25
According to the ATSA requirement, a Privacy
Officer has been nominated in the US Department
of Homeland Security26 to implement privacy
requirements and to control their respect. This
Privacy Officer is member of the Department of
Homeland Security.
It is quite obvious that all the measures
described affect significantly data controllers27
which are operating from foreign countries and
create new risks for the protection of personal data
with European origin. The data relates to travellers
(more or less 12 million passengers) flying to US
and the requirements of US government interfere
with the national legislation applicable to airline
companies’ data processing activities in the foreign
countries where the passengers make the
reservation, buy the ticket, take the plane, etc. and
put into question their sovereignty by operating far
beyond the US borders. To justify this
extraterritorial approach, US authorities have
developed a new conception of their own
sovereignty not limited to the physical borders: 
[b]ut in the 21st Century, border security can
no longer be just a coastline, or a line on the
ground between two nations. It’s also a line of
information in a computer, telling us who is in the
country, for how long, and for what reason… In
the 21st Century it is not enough to place
inspectors at our ports of entry to monitor the
flow of goods and people. We must also have a
‘virtual border’ that operates far beyond the land
border of the United States.28
This reasoning has been also held in the
context of the ECHELON case,29 which is a UK-
US system of electronic surveillance of the
messages exchanged through satellites. The
ECHELON system was, indeed, criticised by the
European Parliament as violating the European
fundamental right to privacy.30 (see p 92 above) 
Notwithstanding, the TSA issued a notice
narrowing the scope of the CAPPS II, published on
the Federal Register on 1 August 2003.31 This notice
describes how the TSA will use CAPPS II and which
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changes have been made from the notice published
at the Federal Register on 15 January 2003. Indeed,
many comments and negative reactions were
received in response to the prior Privacy Act notice.
That has generated an obvious need to make some
reforms in the proposal to make it data privacy
compliant. For instance, whereas the original
document on CAPPS II stated that information
about individuals would be maintained for up to 50
years, the new notice expressed that for almost all
passengers, that information will be deleted soon
after the trip is safely completed, and for a “few
risk” persons, the length of time the information
will be kept is still under consideration.
3. Reactions in the US
Jan Adams and Rebecca Gordon of California,
for example, were detained at San Francisco
International Airport, and told that their names
appeared on the secret ‘no-fly’ list. The two
women – peace activists who publish a newspaper
called War Times – were told nothing about why
they were on such a list, or how they could get
off. The ACLU has filed suit against the Federal
Government on their behalf to find out how the
‘no fly’ lists were created, how they are being
maintained or corrected and, most importantly,
how people who are mistakenly included on the
list can have their names taken off. One question
we believe needs answering is whether our clients
are on the ‘no fly’ list because of their First
Amendment protected political views.32
This is just an example of the role that civil
liberties advocates are playing in the discussion on
the implementation of the new measures. The
Electronic Privacy Information Center ( EPIC) had
posted on its website several pages33 with news
about the debate on passenger data and the
campaigns against the US policy. Moreover, they
have submitted an action against the Department
of Homeland Security, the Transportation Security
Administration and the Department of Defense,
under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA),
seeking the release of agency records concerning
airline passenger screening procedures requested
by EPIC from defendants.34
Indeed, EPIC sent a letter to the TSA on 10
March 2003 requesting records related to CAPPS II
project addressing the following subjects: 
(a) any existing legal, statutory and/or
regulatory frameworks concerning governmental
access to and use of transactional and other
records about individuals. This request includes,
but is not limited to, any assessments of the legal
authority (or lack thereof) for information
collection activities planned or proposed for the
CAPPS II project; and (b) potential privacy and/or
civil liberties implications of the activities planned
or proposed for the CAPPS II project. 
The answer was delivered late and incomplete.
Apart from that, John Gilmore, a US citizen,
filed a lawsuit against John Ashcroft (in his official
capacity as Attorney General of the US) and other
civil servants (with responsibilities in connected
areas). Giving a frame to his action he said that he
was “concerned that the climate of fear that
currently pervades American society [is] eroding
long-standing constitutional rights”.35 Basically, he
challenged the “secret” character of a regulation
limiting people’s right to travel anonymously and
the use of “no-fly lists” that are created and
maintained without transparency and control. In
his complaint it is expressed: 
[p]laintiff objects to the unregulated use of
such lists because he believes history teaches that
granting the government unlimited control over
‘enemies list’ will inevitably result in abuse. 
It is interesting to see the myriad of
constitutional causes of action raised by the
plaintiff.36 Particularly in what concerns the First
Amendment, it has been pointed out that:
[f]ew activities implicate the assembly clause of
the First Amendment as directly as travel. When
people travel to assemble, as they do when they
travel for business or organization meetings or
conventions, or to meet friends and relatives, their
travel is an act of assembly. Travel is not just an
activity often engaged in for purposes protected
under other clauses of the First Amendment (such
as travel to petition the government for a redress
of grievances, or travel for purposes protected as
freedom of speech or of the press), but travel is, in
and of itself, an activity directly protected under
the assembly clause of the First Amendment.37
Even if the final decisions of the cases referred
have not been adopted yet, we can see that the way
the measures we are discussing here are being
implemented not only raise legal doubts from an
international point of view, but from an internal
point of view as well.38
B. The EU answers: from the
stand-still position towards
adequate protection
The nature of the extra-territorial effects of US
decisions have provoked reactions from the EU








authorities.39 We will comment on them in what
follows. Nevertheless, we will first describe the
European and EU legal background concerning
privacy and personal data protection in order to
visualize clearly the legal fundamentals of EU
concerns. We will also assess what would be the
legal basis for regulation of the trans-border data
flows (TBDF) under analysis.
1. European (international level) and
EU (supranational level) legal
background
When analysing privacy and data protection
applicable legislation in Europe we have to
consider a plethora of instruments at different
levels. It is important to understand their different
scope of application as well as their relevance.
In the International context we have to focus
on the Council of Europe Convention. Privacy is a
fundamental right included in article 8 of the
European Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,40
where it is stated:
1. Everyone has the right to respect for his
private and family life, his home and his
correspondence.
2. There shall be no interference by a public
authority with the exercise of this right except such
as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in
a democratic society in the interests of national
security, public safety or the economic well-being of
the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime,
for the protection of health or morals, or for the
protection of the rights and freedoms of others.
This provision has been largely interpreted by
the doctrine, as well as applied by the European
Court of Human Rights (ECHR).41 It is the
source for EU legislation dealing with privacy and
the protection of personal data, as well as of
national legislation. We will come back to the
interpretation given by the ECHR to the exception
contained in point 2 of the Article, since it is
clearly relevant for the topic under study.
The Council of Europe has adopted also the
Convention for the Protection of Individuals with
regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data,42
and a series of Recommendations following a
sectoral criteria.43 We have to bear in mind that this
Convention is of great importance for areas that are
not covered by Community law, such as those of the
second and third pillar, since Directive 95/46/EC44 is
a first pillar Directive, which application is excluded
in relation to those areas. Furthermore, most of EU
Member States, while transposing the Directive to
their internal law, have extended the scope of the
national data protection law to the areas excluded
by the Directive (e.g. criminal law). In those cases,
national law has to respect Convention no. 108.
Apart from that, it is important to point out that, if
any legal problem arises concerning those areas
where the European Court of Justice cannot
intervene, it will be the European Court of Human
Rights that will give a decision on any case of
potential violation to Article 8 at national level. 
At EU level, the European Union Charter of
Fundamental Rights45 has included in its scope
not only the right to privacy but also the right to
the protection of personal data as a distinct
fundamental right:
Article 7, Respect for private and family life: 
Everyone has the right to respect for his or
her private and family life, home and
communications.
Article 8, Protection of personal data:
1. Everyone has the right to the protection of
personal data concerning him or her. 
2. Such data must be processed fairly for
specified purposes and on the basis of the consent
of the person concerned or some other legitimate
basis laid down by law. Everyone has the right of
access to data which has been collected concerning
him or her, and the right to have it rectified. 
3. Compliance with these rules shall be subject
to control by an independent authority.
Even if, for the time being, the Charter is not
legally binding, its philosophy affects the three
pillars of EU law. The Charter stresses the nature
of privacy and data protection as fundamental
rights within the EU and individualizes each one,
pointing out their autonomy. That proves that they
are essential concepts for the EU policy design,
and constitute part of European public order.46
Beyond Article 8 of the European Convention
for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms, which mentions only the
right to privacy (even if the interpretation has
extended it to “data protection”),47 the EU Charter
asserts that data subjects are protected not only as
regards their sensitive data or intimacy but also
concerning all their personal data (what is, indeed,
an objective concept), not only against States’
action but also against private bodies. In order to
ensure that protection, the Charter does emphasise
three main principles: 
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1. The absolute obligation to control the
legitimate purposes pursued by the data controller; 
2. The right of the data subject to access his
own data and 
3. The need for an independent authority to
intervene in order to secure respect for the two
first principles.48
Furthermore, the draft Treaty establishing a
Constitution for Europe49 establishes in its Article
50 that:
1. Everyone has the right to the protection of
personal data concerning him or her.
2. A European law shall lay down the rules
relating to the protection of individuals with
regard to the processing of personal data by
Union Institutions, bodies and agencies, and by
the Member States when carrying out activities
which come under the scope of Union law, and
the rules relating to the free movement of such
data. Compliance with these rules shall be subject
to the control of an independent authority.
2. Legal basis to regulate on TBDF
The first aspect to be considered is the legal basis
to regulate the transfer of personal data made as a
result of the requirements of US authorities, as
well as the access to systems located in the EU
from the US.
(a) Is Directive 95/46/EC applicable to the
transfer of passengers’ personal  data?
Secondary legislation regulating the protection of
privacy and personal data has been adopted in the
context of the first pillar of EU law through two
Directives: a general Directive 95/46/EC and a specific
Directive 97/66/EC50 concerning the processing of
personal data and the protection of privacy in the
telecommunications sector (replaced by the Privacy
and Electronic Communications Directive
2002/58/EC on 31 October 2003).51
Indeed, Directive 95/46/EC was passed with the
objective of preventing Member States from
restricting or prohibiting the free flow of personal
data between them for reasons connected with the
protection of fundamental rights and freedoms of
natural persons, and in particular their right to
privacy with respect to the processing of personal
data. In order to achieve this goal it harmonises, to
a certain extent, the rights and obligations in
relation to the processing of personal data, creating
a high standard of protection for personal data.
It is clear that the general Directive is
applicable to the processing of personal data
(material scope of application)52 carried out by
airline companies (personal scope of application,
being “data controllers”)53 in the EU (spatial
scope of application).54 Then, if they proceed to
transfer this data abroad, consideration has to be
given to Articles 25 and 26 of the Directive.
Nevertheless, and given the particular nature
of this TBDF, that is, not being made by the
companies at their own initiative, but as a
consequence of a mandatory requirement imposed
by US authorities for the purpose of identifying
individuals who may pose a threat to aviation
safety or national security,55 we may wonder
whether Articles 25 and 26 of the Directive would
be the proper legal basis to regulate the TBDF in
this particular case, or whether it would be the
only legal basis to tackle the requirements. 
Indeed, assessment would have to be made
about the role that the second and/or third pillars
(Titles V and VI of the TEU) of EU law would
play in this context. Regarding the second pillar, in
Article 11 of the TEU it is stated: 
1. The Union shall define and implement a
common foreign and security policy covering all
areas of foreign and security policy, the objectives
of which shall be: 
 to safeguard the common values,
fundamental interests, independence and
integrity of the Union in conformity with the
principles of the United Nations Charter,
 to strengthen the security of the Union in all
ways,
 to preserve peace and strengthen
international security, in accordance with the
principles of the United Nations Charter, as well as
the principles of the Helsinki Final Act and the
objectives of the Paris Charter, including those on
external borders,
 to promote international cooperation,
 to develop and consolidate democracy and
the rule of law, and respect for human rights and
fundamental freedoms.
As far as the third pillar is concerned, Article
29 TEU states: 
Without prejudice to the powers of the
European Community, the Union's objective shall
be to provide citizens with a high level of safety
within an area of freedom, security and justice by
developing common action among the Member
States in the fields of police and judicial
cooperation in criminal matters and by preventing
and combating racism and xenophobia.








That objective shall be achieved by preventing
and combating crime, organised or otherwise, in
particular terrorism, (…).
If for the purpose of safeguarding those
objectives it is considered necessary to enter into
an agreement with the US, then the way to
instrument this decision would not be based on a
Directive in which the legal basis is the former
Article 100A TEC (current Article 95 TCE), being
the legal basis for Internal Market instruments.
A very delicate question is then: would an
agreement under Articles 24 or 38 TEU, which
regulate the conclusion of international
agreements when necessary for the implementation
of the respective Titles of the TEU, be necessary?
In case of a positive answer, would this exclude the
application of the Directive? 
In our opinion, the application of the Directive
would not be excluded, since the bodies required to
send passengers’ personal data are private bodies,
which processing activities are regulated by this
Directive. Even if an agreement under Articles 24 or
38 TEU dealing with the transfer of personal data
in the circumstances we are describing in the present
article would be situated under the scope of Article
13.1 of the Directive (then processing activities
would be legitimated under Article 7(c)), data
controllers (airline companies) would not be
exempted from all their obligations. We have to
bear in mind that Article 13.1 does not exempt data
controllers from the respect of Articles 8, 17 and 18
of the Directive. That means that in the field of the
airline companies’ responsibilities, obligations
remain vis-à-vis the data subject. As a consequence,
if they do not comply with those obligations while
transferring data they could be declared liable. 
Furthermore, since the relationship between
the passenger and the airline company is regulated,
prima facie, by the Directive, and considering that
we are dealing with a transfer that will be used in
the context of CAPPS II to take “automated
individual decisions”, attention has to be paid to
Article 15 of the Directive, which has not been
mentioned in Article 13.1 of the Directive either. 
However, and given the intricate characteristics
of the situation we are commenting, additional
actions would have to be taken that will exceed the
first pillar. Indeed, one may wonder whether the
EU can accept that data with an EU origin received
by US authorities might be used, for instance, as
part of the evidence in a judicial process that
might result in the death penalty,56 or whether
“reciprocity”57 in the case of flights coming to the
EU from the US would under certain
circumstances, be required, etc. Those issues,
among others, might be the object of an
international agreement based on Articles 24 or 38
TEU58 that would complement the regulations of
Directive 95/46/EC. (Indeed, it seems that the third
pillar would have more relevance than the second
one in this realm.)
(b) Which TBDF provision is applicable under
Directive 95/46/EC?
Considering that the Directive has to be applied to
this case, Article 25.1 of the Directive has to be
taken into account, since it sets out the principle
that Member States shall only allow a transfer to
take place if the third country in question ensures
an “adequate” level of protection. The aim of this
regulation is protecting data subjects’ rights and
preventing circumvention of the rules contained in
the Directive by sending personal data to countries
where the rules are not as strict as in the EU or
simply inexistent in order to carry out processing
activities.59
This general principle is softened in different
ways by several provisions of the Directive. In the
case of passengers’ data required by the US it is
necessary to analyse what is the suitable legal
mechanism to allow this procedure in a lawful way.
We have to assess then, which are the derogations
to the general principle, what are the characteristics
of the US requirements,60 and as a consequence
which measures the EU would need to adopt.
The notion of “adequate” protection, though,
has to be linked to the degree of risk a transfer
presents and to the nature of the data. 
The adequacy of the level of protection
afforded by a third country shall be assessed in the
light of all the circumstances surrounding a data
transfer operation or set of data transfer
operations; particular consideration shall be given
to the nature of the data, the purpose and duration
of the proposed processing operation or operations,
the country of origin and country of final
destination, the rules of law, both general and
sectoral, in force in the third country in question
and the professional rules and security measures
which are complied with in that country.61
(i) Is Article 26.1.applicable?
There are some cases in which a transfer or a set of
transfers of personal data to a third country does
not ensure an adequate level of protection. A set of
derogations to the general principle is created by
the Directive, so the transfer will be possible when:
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(a) the data subject has given his consent
unambiguously to the proposed transfer; or
(b) the transfer is necessary for the performance
of a contract between the data subject and the
controller or the implementation of pre-
contractual measures taken in response to the
data subject's request; or
(c) the transfer is necessary for the conclusion
or performance of a contract concluded in the
interest of the data subject between the
controller and a third party; or
(d) the transfer is necessary or legally required
on important public interest grounds, or for the
establishment, exercise or defence of legal claims; or
(e) the transfer is necessary in order to protect
the vital interests of the data subject; or
(f) the transfer is made from a register which
according to laws or regulations is intended to
provide information to the public and which is
open to consultation either by the public in
general or by any person who can demonstrate
legitimate interest, to the extent that the
conditions laid down in law for consultation are
fulfilled in the particular case.62
The use of those derogations would not be
suitable for the case under analysis.63 If we consider
paragraph (a), for instance, we know that “consent”
should be “freely given” (among other characteristics
that “consent” should fulfil to be considered valid),
and this is not indeed the case here because airline
companies are obliged to send the data.
Furthermore, even if the relationship between the
airline company and the passenger is of purely
private nature, where party autonomy prevails, a
passenger cannot give consent for something that the
company is not free to do. As a consequence, the
rules of liability would not be the standard ones, but
the exceptional ones (if the US government misuses
the data transferred by the airline companies, and
given the case that a data subject sues the company,
the company will oppose an exception to its liability
due to its mandatory public duties (factum principis).
If we consider paragraph (d), its application
will lead us to the rules contained in Article 13.1
of the Directive. The said regulation provides that:
Member States may adopt legislative
measures to restrict the scope of the obligations
and rights provided for in Articles 6 (1), 10, 11 (1),
12 and 21 when such a restriction constitutes a
necessary measures to safeguard:
(a) national security; 
(b) defence;
(c) public security;
(d) the prevention, investigation, detection
and prosecution of criminal offences, or breaches
of ethic for regulated professions; 
(e) an important economic or financial interest
of a Member sate or of the European Union, (…);
(f) a monitoring, inspection or regulatory
function connected, even occasionally, with the
exercise of official authority in cases referred to in
(c), (d) and (e);
(g) the protection of the data subject or of
the rights and freedoms of others.64
It is noted that the exception does not operate in
a systematic fashion since exceptions are of
restrictive interpretation and application. A
hypothetical measure, using this Article as the legal
basis to allow the application of the derogation
contained in Article 26.1(d), would not be taken for
the “national security” of a Member State, but in
compliance with the requirements of a third
country’s “national security”. This does not seem to
be the strict raison d’être for the exception as
foreseen in the letter of the EU law. Furthermore, if
any exception to the protection of data privacy is
adopted respect has to be given to Article 8.2 of the
European Convention on Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms, that is, the restriction must
be adopted “in accordance with the law” and when
“necessary in a democratic society”. Those requisites
are, indeed, cumulative.65 To use this exception, a
law should be passed (at national or supranational
level) and the Member State or the EU would have
the burden to prove that there was no other means to
safeguard the public interest at stake in a ‘less-
invasive-to-privacy’ way, or less violating of the data
subject’ rights.66
(ii) Is Article 26.2. applicable?
Another alternative way for making a safe transfer
is the use of contractual clauses.67 They can be
proposed by the controller (in this case,
hypothetically, the airline company) to the member
State Authority for approval, they can be elaborated
by this Authority as “standard contractual clauses”
or even by the European Commission. This is the
case of a Commission Decision on standard
contractual clauses for the transfer of personal data
to third countries (to controllers) under article 26.4
of Directive 95/46/EC 68 and the Commission
Decision on standard contractual clauses for the
transfer of personal data to processors established
in third countries, under Directive 95/46/EC.69
However, given the specific circumstances of
the case we are dealing with, this is not an
There are some
cases in which a
transfer or a set
of transfers of






appropriate way either, since the transfer of
personal data are not being made on the basis of
voluntary initiatives taken by the data exporter
and the data importer, but rather from an
obligation to transfer data arisen from US law that
is imposed upon airline companies.
(iii) What about the application of the “Safe
Harbour Principles”?
Apart from the derogations mentioned above, the
European Commission may find that a third
country ensures an adequate level of protection of
personal data and issue a Decision declaring the
“adequacy”, what will result in the free circulation
of data in the circumstances described in the
mentioned instrument. Given the remarkably
different conception for the protection of personal
data and privacy existent in the EU and the US, it
was not possible for the European Commission,
even after long negotiations with US, civil servants,
to declare that the country’s regime, as a whole,
assured an adequate level of protection. A partial
solution was found with the adoption of the
Agreement known as “Safe Harbour”,70 which
determines that an arrangement put in place by the
US Department of Commerce provides adequate
level of protection for personal data transferred
from the EU. The results are the Safe Harbour
principles, which are supplemented by FAQs
(Frequently Asked Questions), published by the
Department of Commerce. 
Adherence to these principles is voluntary, but
is only available for companies under the
jurisdiction of certain public bodies that control
the fairness of “commercial” practices. Indeed,
European airline companies71 are not under the
jurisdiction of those bodies.
A specific agreement would be necessary for the
transfer of air passengers’ data to US authorities.
What should be the characteristics of this
instrument? What are the main issues at stake? What
is the state-of-the-art of the EU-US dialogue in this
realm? We will address those issues in the following
points. Notwithstanding, it is important to consider
that there are other legal issues that need to be taken
into account concerning US requirements.
(c) A crucial question: Article 4.1.c) or Article
25.1?
Before going further, another relevant issue to
discuss is: what kind of system will be/is being
implemented by US authorities to gain knowledge of
passengers’ data? Even if we have been mentioning
the fact of “transfers” so far, it has to be noted that
“transfer” (“push” system) is required to feed certain
databases such as APIS and that  direct “access” to
PNR (“pull” system) is also required. 
The factual procedure (pull or push) will each
derive in a different legal regime. For the “push”
system application of Articles 25 and 26 of the
Directive has to be made, whereas the “pull”
system will configure the case described in Article
4.1.c) of the Directive (considering the presence of
the connecting factor as described in this norm,
would certainly derive from the application of the
Directive as a whole.)72
Article 4.1(c) foresees that the national law
transposing the Directive is applicable to the
processing of personal data where:
The controller is not established on
Community territory and, for the purposes of
processing personal data makes use of equipment,
automated or otherwise, situated on the territory
of the said Member State, unless such equipment
is used only for the purposes of transit through
the territory of the Community.
Can US authorities, accessing PNR data stored
in an on-line system situated in the territory of a
Member State, be considered as the “controller” of
this data? We know that the controller is the person
who “determines the purposes and means of the
processing data”.73 We could envisage that the
purpose US authorities have for accessing the PNR
(access is a processing activity) would be the fight
against terrorism, and the means they decided to
use for processing passengers’ data as one way to
fight against terrorism would be the PNR system.
If the reasoning is made in that direction, following
the letter of the Directive and the interpretation of
the Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, then
the controller (the US government) should
designate a representative established in the
territory of the Member State where the equipment
is located (Article 4.2 of the Directive), who should
comply with the obligations foreseen in the
Directive for data controllers (notification,
information, security measures, etc.).
We can see that the Joint Statement, elaborated
by the European Commission and US Customs after
the Talks on PNR transmission, has incorporated
the following wording in point 5.1: 
In accessing the PNR data in the territory of
the Community, US Customs undertakes to respect
the principles of the Data Protection Directive.74
Nevertheless, we could infer that the actual
meaning of this phrase has not been fully considered
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since there is no evidence of a US will to designate a
representative established in the territory of the EU
(the relevant Member State) who will comply with
the obligations above mentioned. Even if this “will”
would exist, who would be the legitimate
representative of the US government (who would be
responsible in case of non-compliance)?75 May be,
this would be another issue to consider in a third
pillar agreement.
After “accessing” the PNR, data will be
transferred to the US to be integrated, for instance,
into CAPPS II. This transfer will require application
of Articles 25 and 26 (it has to be borne in mind that,
when Article 4.1(c) foresees the application of the
Directive as a whole, it does not exclude the rules
dealing with TBDF if, following the use of
equipment in the EU, a transfer takes place). Then,
an adequacy assessment will have to be made in this
regard.
(d) Preliminary conclusions 
To sum up we can say that, whereas Directive
95/46/EC is applicable to airline companies for
regulating the requirements of US authorities
regarding access and transfer of passengers’ data,
consideration would have to be given to the need for
an agreement between the EU and the US in the field
of the second or third pillars of EU law. Concerning
the applicability of the Directive, if what is required
is “access” to PNR, then Article 4.1(c) and 4.2 are the
rules to be taken into account (plus Articles 25 and
26, to cover the transfer to take place subsequently to
the access). If, on the contrary, the requirements
consist in the “transfer” of data (without direct
access), Articles 25 and 26 will play their role. As far
as the derogations to Article 25.1 are concerned, the
most appropriate of them would be a Decision based
on Article 25.6, provided all the requirements for an
Adequacy Finding are strictly given.
3. Actions undertaken
Soon after the US decisions concerning passengers’
data certain EU Data Protection Commissioners
expressed doubts and concerns about the
compliance of the US requests with the EU Data
Protection requirements. That led to the delivery
of a first Opinion by the Article 29 Data
Protection Working Party taken on its own
initiative.76
More generally, the Working Party has issued a
document on the need for a balance approach to
the fight against terrorism77 where it stresses the
need to respect all data protection principles in the
legislation adopted and also expresses certain
concern about the tendency to represent the
protection of personal data as a barrier to the
efficient fight against terrorism: The Working
Party underlines, in particular, the necessity to take
into account the long term impact of urgent
policies rapidly implemented or envisaged at this
moment. This long-term reflection is all the more
necessary in view of the fact that terrorism is not a
new phenomenon and cannot be qualified as a
temporary phenomenon. The Working Party also
underlines the obligation to respect the principle of
proportionality in relation to any measure
restricting the fundamental right to privacy as
required by Article 8 of the European Convention
on Human Rights and the relevant case-law. This
implies, inter alia, the obligation to demonstrate
that any measure taken corresponds to an
‘imperative social need’. Measures which are
simply ‘useful’ or ‘wished’ may not restrict the
fundamental rights and freedoms. (…).
A Joint Statement78 was signed between the
European Commission and US Customs, following
high level officials’ talks on PNR transmission.
Certain undertakings were asked of US authorities
in order to comply with the Data Protection
Directive. Furthermore, full exercise of the US
Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) in connection
with the data collected by US authorities in order
to provide access to data by EU data subjects, as
well as certain limits as regards the transmission of
PNR data by the US Customs and TSA to other
US administrations were agreed. 
Beyond these minimal points of agreement it
was explicitly foreseen that other safeguards would
be proposed by the US through additional
undertakings in such a way that adequate
protection might be offered to personal data with
an EU origin and that the European Commission
would be able to issue a Decision under Article
25.6 of the Directive.79
The validity of the legal basis of this Joint
Statement has been seriously challenged by S.
Rodota, chairman of the Article 29 Data Protection
Working Party, through a letter to the Chair of the
EU Parliament’s Committee on Citizen’s Freedoms
and Rights dated 3 March 2003. 80
The European Parliament has broadly echoed
those concerns.81 A document82 has been delivered
stressing not only the prima facie lack of adequate
protection offered by the US regulatory system but
also denouncing the European Commission’s failure,
as the guardian of the Treaties and Community law,










it needs to verify whether there is a real basis
in US law to justify access to reservation systems’
data or whether this is an over-broad
interpretation on the part of the present
Administration (…); it is continuing to postpone
the verification of the US legislation required
under Article 25 of Directive 95/46/EC (…); last but
not least, it is failing to provide information to the
public, who should be the first to know what is
being done with information about them; (…).83
It is important to point out that the Parliament,
despite having regard to Directive 95/46/EC,
expresses itself as being “surprised that these issues
have not been considered in the context of the
agreements on judicial and police cooperation,
(…)”, which would let us infer that a double
approach (first and third pillar) is being envisaged
for the subject matter. 
In order to prepare the Commission’s Decision
under article 25.6, the Article 29 Data Protection
Working Party issued a second Opinion on 13 June
2003.84 This Opinion examines to what extent the
US decisions are offering an adequate protection.
In what follows we will analyse the principles that
should be taken into account when adopting an
Adequacy Decision, assessing the way the
problems arising in this particular realm are being
or should be tackled.
C. Certain considerations for an
“adequacy” assessment 
This part of the article does not intend to provide
a complete adequacy assessment for the transfer of
passengers’ data from the EU to the US. It only
points out some specific issues that can present
certain problems.
It is clear that the Joint Statement has no legal
value,85 but it is a first step in a dialogue at political
level. It does not cover a full analysis of the
principles described in the Working Document no.
12 elaborated by the Article 29 Working Party.86 We
will try to make an approximation to the principles
described in this Working Document, vis-à-vis the
Joint Statement and the Undertakings87 (indeed, the
statements made in these documents are related to
the “access” to PNR data. We insist on the point
that in this case the Directive as a whole has to be
applied due to Article 4.1(c)), in the light of the
requirements contained in the Aviation and
Transportation Security Act, as well as of certain
recent documents dealing with CAPPS II.
As we have already mentioned, the Joint
Statement says:
(a) [i]n accessing the PNR data in the territory of
the Community, US Customs undertakes to respect
the principles of the Data Protection Directive. 
The analysis to be made in this regard is what
kind of access can be admitted, which part of
PNR can be made available to US authorities, how
the Standard Query Language (SQL) will be
designed to restrict or filter the access, who will be
the representative of the US government in the EU
(Article 4.2 of the Directive)? 
Having said that, and considering that the
processing activities to carry out are not only
“access” but also “transfer” of the results for further
matching at CAPPS II level, respect will have to be
given to Articles 25 and 26 of the Directive. Given
the analysis we have made supra, the appropriate
tool for the transfer will be an Adequacy Decision
under Article 25.6. The documents reflect a
discussion at “adequacy” level that is, the principles
to be complied with for an Adequacy Decision. Yet
there is a complete lack of reference as to how
compliance with the Directive as a whole will be
assured (Articles 4.1(c) and 4.2 of the Directive).
On the other side, the transfer of passengers
and crew manifests are not dealt in those
documents, whilst it is clear that an “adequacy”
assessment and Decision is absolutely necessary in
this realm for a legal transfer to take place. In
order to structure this adequacy assessment we
take as the point of departure the three main
principles enacted by the EU Charter of Human
Rights already evoked:
(…)1. Such data must be processed fairly for
specified purposes and on the consent of the
person concerned or some legitimate basis laid
down by law.
2. Everyone has the right of access to data
which has been collected concerning him or her,
and the right to have it rectified. 
3. Compliance with these rules shall be subject
to control by an independent authority.
1. The legitimate basis and “purpose
limitation” principle:
(a) The legitimate basis:
According to the Article 8 of the European
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights
and Fundamental Freedoms a legal and fully
transparent legal basis must exist for justifying a
data processing limiting privacy rights. This
requirement is not fulfilled in the case insofar as the
US decisions, that is to say the Undertakings, are
not at this stage legally binding and that there is no
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clear view from the European point of view of all
the regulations which are surrounding the multiple
data processing generated by the PNR flows. 
Furthermore, considering that these purposes
are determined in a state of “emergency”, it would
be necessary to add a “sunset clause”. Indeed,
geopolitical situations88 can change very fast, and
the purposes for the collection of data that are
based in those situations would need to be adapted.
More fundamentally certain doubts might be
expressed as regards the requirement of “specificity”,
which is a hard core principle established by the case
law of the European Court of Human Rights89
grounded on Article 8 of the ECHR. Any extensive
exploratory or general surveillance of data90 is
prohibited; the circumstances under which the
processing of the data can take place must be
specified and the conditions to which it is subject
must be identified with sufficient precision. 
(b) The unspecified purpose:
The Joint Statement does not specify the purpose
for the transmission of passengers’ data. Point 6
states that:
[i]t was agreed that the information and
undertakings to be provided would need to cover
in particular: definition of the purposes for which
the data will be used and limitation of the use of
these purposes; (…)”. Point 5(e) expresses that
“US Customs may provide information to other US
law enforcement authorities only for purposes of
preventing and combating terrorism and other
serious criminal offences, who specifically request
PNR information from US Customs. 
The Annex to the Joint Statement declares that:
The United States Customs represents that: (…)
PNR data is used by Customs strictly for enforcement
purposes, including use in threat analysis to identify
and interdict potential terrorists and other threats to
national and public security, and to focus Customs
resources on high risk concerns, (…).
The Aviation and Transportation Security Act
(ATSA) §114(h) (4) specifies that:
In consultation with the Transportation Security
Oversight Board, the Under Secretary shall (…)
consider requiring passenger air carriers to share
passenger lists with appropriate Federal agencies
for the purpose of identifying individuals who may
pose a threat to aviation safety or national security.
There is an urgent need to define the terms
used both by US Regulations and the Joint
Statement as an answer, not only to the purpose
limitation principle contained in European data
protection regulations, but more generally to the
legality principle of criminal law.
What is “terrorism”?91 What are the “other
serious criminal offences”? What has to be
understood by “threat to aviation safety or national
security”? How is the “potential” to be a terrorist
be determined? What kind of parameters will be
used? Then, would the purpose of “preventing and
combating terrorism and other serious criminal
offences” be broadened by the consideration of the
purpose expressed in the ATSA? Which other US
statute contains purposes for which PNR data or
passengers’ and crew manifests may be used?92
(c) The “data quality and proportionality”
principle:
Data has to be accurate and kept updated.
Consideration has to be given, for instance, to the US
legislation that determines lists of terrorist groups.
Normally, the data on passengers is controlled using
those lists. However, the integration of those lists
may generate certain concerns. This question has
been posed by a Member of the Belgian Parliament
in the Hearing organised in June 2001.93
Another concern is expressed by Hasbrouck
regarding the quality of the data to be gathered in
the context of CAPPS II.94 Within this system,
passengers’ data will be confronted with data
coming from other sources, particularly with the
FBI’s database on outstanding warrants for crime
and violence. As regards this database the FBI has
explicitly asserted that it has no obligation to ensure
the accuracy of the data so processed. Therefore it
might happen that travel would be denied to a
person on the basis of false information. 
The exaggerated duration of the data storage
has created serious concerns regarding CAPPS II.
However, it seems that the doubts have been, to a
certain extent, dissipated (supra). Nevertheless,
clarification has to be given regarding APIS.
The principle under analysis is in direct
interdependence with the “purpose limitation”
one, since whether the data processed is adequate,
relevant and not excessive can only be determined
in relation to the purpose. 
Special attention has to be paid to sensitive
data,95 and the definition given to this concept. For
instance, the definition given in the Safe Harbour
Agreement differs from the one contained in the
Directive. It is expected that in the future Agreement
concerning passengers’ data, respect be given to the
definition of he Directive. The Undertakings express







that “CBP and TSA are committed to filtering
sensitive data (…)”.96 Specifications will have to be
given concerning the characteristics of the filters to
be implemented or design of SQL. 
It is further stated that:
[w]ith respect to sensitive PNR data that has
been transferred by air carriers to CBP, should it
become necessary for CBP to use such sensitive
data for purposes of preventing and combating
terrorism and serious criminal offences, any such
use will be subject to specific approval procedures,
involving the US Deputy Commissioner of CBP, in
consultation with the DHS Chief Privacy Officer.97
Can the EU accept this statement, considering
that if these data has already been transferred, it
was made in violation of the Directive?
The proportionality principle assessment, that
is whether the data is adequate, relevant and not
excessive, has to be complemented by a “necessity
test”, which normally evaluates to what extent the
data kept is the only suitable and available means
for the assurance of the purpose followed. The data
is “necessary” if there is no other less invasive
means to reach that purpose. The obligation under
article 8 of the ECHR to adopt the less privacy
intrusive measure has to be recalled in that context. 
It is not possible to make a general statement
about the implications of the “pull” and the
“push” systems because the risks created for the
protection of personal data depend on the
modalities of implementation of those systems.
For instance, it is obvious that, if what US
authorities require is  “full” access to PNR data,
this system would be certainly far less respectful of
data protection rights than the “transfer” of
passengers’ and crew manifests. Since the amount
of data available would be limited in the second
case, it would not include sensitive data, etc.
However, if we think about the SQL, and the fact
that code can be created to determine not only
“who” is authorized to access, but also “what” he
is entitled to do (only reading, reading and copy,
etc) and regarding “which data” (the whole data
base, only certain information, about certain
persons, etc.), we can see that it can be an
interesting way to limit access to sensitive data, or
other data considered excessive. Furthermore, it
would be possible to check whether unauthorized
bodies or persons gain access by analysing the log
files of the system.
In this regard, it would be also necessary to
include a “sunset clause” to evaluate how the limits
to the data protection rights created by those systems
effectively contribute to the fight against terrorism. 
(d) Restrictions on onward transfers:
The Decision to be adopted by the European
Commission should be specific concerning the
bodies (public or private) entitled to receive
passengers’ data and the responsibility they have.
The Joint Statement is quite vague when saying:
(…) other law enforcement entities may
specifically request PNR information from Customs
and Customs, in its discretion, may provide such
information for national security or in furtherance
of other legitimate law enforcement purposes; for
purposes of regulating the dissemination of PNR
data which may be shared with other law
enforcement entities, Customs is considered the
‘owner’ of the data and such entities are
obligated by the terms of disclosure to obtain
Customs express authorization for any further
dissemination (sometimes referred to as the ‘Third
Agency Rule’); (…).
Again, the problem of purpose limitation is
present here; “other legitimate law enforcement
purposes” is really a very wide purpose that can
include any kind of crime, which potentially
violates the proportionality principle.
2. The right to a transparent and
secure processing
(a) The “transparency” principle:
Passengers have to be provided with information
about the purpose of the processing, their rights,
as well as which US agencies are entitled to have
access to their personal data. The application of
this principle can be limited pursuant to Article 13
of the Directive. Any limitation to the right to be
informed pursuant to Article 13.1 has to be clearly
stated in order to evaluate the proportionality of
the measure. Moreover:
[t]he Working Party underlines the necessity to
have commitments from the US side that are
officially published at least at the level of the
Federal Register and fully binding on the US side.98
(b) The “security” principle: 
The Annex to the Joint Statement specifies certain
characteristics of the security measures. The
measures mentioned are those adopted by
Customs, but the document is silent concerning
the measures adopted by the other bodies to
which data are likely to be transferred/shared
with.
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(c) The “rights of access, rectification and
opposition”:
The Joint Statement affirms that:
[a]s concerns a first party request for
disclosure of data by the data subject, US Customs
will proceed with disclosure under the Freedom
of Information Act (FOIA). 
It would be advisable to create a standard form for
access requests under the FOIA with translation to
every Community language, considering that not
every data subject who travels to the US, and whose
data is required in a mandatory way, speaks English,
or is able to understand how his rights can be
enforced under the FOIA. Translation of the
relevant information including the result of an
access request would have to be assured, otherwise
the data subject who does not speak English would
not know whether he has to exercise his right to
rectification or not.
Moreover, the Article 29 Data Protection
Working Party99 has expressed concern about the
likelihood of the FOIA being used by third parties
to access PNR data held by the US administration.
This possibility has to be prevented.
(d) Independent authority and enforcement
mechanisms:
There is a lack of clarity concerning what would
be the legal remedies available to European data
subjects to enforce their rights and, if necessary,
obtain redress. Travellers need to know not only
what the remedies are but also how affordable they
are and what kind of assistance they are entitled to
receive from public bodies. The system of State
liability for misuse of data with EU origin has to
be described in the document to be signed.
There is a strong need for an “independent
body” to control the implementation of the data
protection rules regarding EU passengers’ data.
Indeed, doubts remain concerning the
independence of the DHS Chief Privacy Officer.
D. Conclusions   
The Joint Statement and the Undertakings are
obviously insufficient to regulate TBDF of
passengers’ data, both from a formal (they are not
a source of Community law) and content (they are
far from covering the requirements for an
adequacy Decision) point of view.
With regard to the legal basis for EU actions,
we reiterate what we have already expressed in the
preliminary conclusions. A complementary
approach between first and third pillars would
have to be developed. Furthermore, whereas
“access” should be ruled in the light of Article
4.1(c) of the Directive, “transfer” has to be ruled
upon under Article 25 and 26. However, an
adequacy Decision (Article 25.6) would be required
to regulate transfers in both cases (in the case of
an integral application of the Directive, as a result
of the “transfer” made of “accessed” PNR data).
The way “access” is operated has to be
thoroughly described, and limitations must be
established concerning the categories of
bodies/persons authorized, the categories of data
that will be disclosed, and what will be the
security measures to be implemented. Among
others, controls in log files will permit follow-up
of how “access” is exercised. 
The purpose has to be delimited as precisely
as possible, since many other parameters of the
adequacy assessment have to be regarded vis-à-vis
this principle (e.g. proportionality, transparency,
security, etc.).
We strongly argue that the fight against
terrorism and the protection of the right of
individuals to be safe are both legitimate
aspirations. The Directive and the European
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights
and Fundamental Freedoms offer legal
instruments to balance the rights to privacy and
personal data protection with them. Balancing
conflicting rights in accordance with the rule of
law (e.g. respecting legal parameters which
proceed to limit any right) is one of the bases of
the democratic system. The conflicting interests
have to be interpreted, and the balance has to be
made, in conjunction because otherwise
contradictory and inapplicable results could arise. 
María Verónica Pérez Asinari, Researcher and
Yves Poullet, Dean of the Faculty of Law, Director
of the CRID (Centre de Recherches Informatique
et Droit) University of Namur
Public security versus data privacy











The US General Accounting Office reported, in February 2004, that the CAPPS II initiative faces significant
implementation challenges. See further:  http://www.epic.org/privacy/airtravel/gao-capps-rpt.pdf An
additional comment on this will appear in a future issue of CLSR.
112
Belgium, http://www.crid.be
This article expresses the own views of the
authors. In no way might it be interpreted as the
opinion of the organisations to which they belong.
We would like to thank Jean-Marc Dinant,
researcher at the CRID, for his clarifying
comments.
FOOTNOTES       
1 In the EU, the fight against terrorism is one of the
specific objectives mentioned in Article 29 TEU. The
Framework Decision of 13 June 2002 on combating
terrorism, OJCE L 164, 22.6.2002, has declared: “Whereas:
(1) The European Union is founded on the universal values
of human dignity, liberty, equality and solidarity, respect
for human rights and fundamental freedoms. It is based on
the principle of democracy and the principle of the rule of
law, principles which are common to the Member States.
(2) Terrorism constitutes one of the most serious
violations of those principles. The La Gomera Declaration
adopted at the informal Council meeting on 14 October
1995 affirmed that terrorism constitutes a threat to
democracy, to the free exercise of human rights and to
economic and social development. (…)”.
2 107th Congress, 24 October 2001. The PATRIOT Act has
been extensively analysed. Whereas certain sectors
consider that it “eliminated the checks and balances that
previously gave courts he opportunity to ensure that
these powers were not abused” (Electronic Frontier
Foundation “EFF Analysis of the Provisions of the USA
PATRIOT Act”, 31 October  2001, available at:
http://www.eff.org/Privacy/Surveillance/Terrorism_militias/2
0011031_eff_usa_patriot_analysis.php , last visited
08/03/02), others argue that “the common wisdom on the
USA Patriot Act is incorrect. The Patriot Act did not
expand law enforcement powers dramatically, as its critics
have alleged. In fact, the Patriot Act made mostly minor
amendments to the electronic surveillance laws” (O. KERR
“Internet Surveillance Law after the USA PATRIOT Act: the
Big Brother that isn’t”, The George Washington University
Law School, Public Law and Legal Theory Working Paper
No. 043, available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=317501).
3 Public Law 107-173, 107th Congress.
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